The dark side of young earth creationism

This comic was shared as a reason to reject creationism. Old Earth Ministries (OEM) exists,

to help the church understand they are following a false teaching, and abandon young earth creationism in favor of accepting the scientific truth that our world is billions of years old. 

The comic presents claims by a creationist which are refuted by an Old Earth advocate. The setup is an enthusiastic but naive and ignorant creationist who repeats creationist teaching and is refuted by an knowledgeable and calm rationalist. The creationist is increasingly angry until he becomes an apostate.

The rhetorical effect is one of creationism being both false and dangerous regardless of whether the actual arguments contained in the comic have any merit. But it must be remembered that falsehood is falsehood regardless of whether or not you keep your cool (or, as often the case, you are actually passive aggressive). Man's anger is to be avoided but so is sowing discord among brothers. You don't get a free pass from God by avoiding wrath if you still bear false witness. Character matters, but so does truth.

The claims of the tract are as follows

1. Scientific theories by creationists are not science but propaganda. Creationism is not scientific
2. Creationism is not taught in the Bible.
3. The Hebrew word "yom" means any time frame, not a normal day.
4. The earth bringing forth fruit is not God doing a miracle thus the time must be longer than a day.
5. Numbering "day" does not make it literal.
6. Putting "evening and morning" does not make it literal.
7. God referring to creating in 6 days and resting on one is not literal because we have other Sabbath patterns.
8. The sun was not created on day 4 it appeared.
9. Human death did not exist before the Fall, but animal death did.
10. If the world is no longer very good then Romans 1:20 cannot be true.
11. God cannot give us meat if carnivory comes from sin.
12. God fixes laws so creation cannot change.
13. If creation changed with Adam then the gospel is diminished.
14. Creationism stared with John Milton's Paradise Lost.
15. Creationism is dangerous because when Christians come to understand it is false they abandon Christianity.

14 of these claims are definitely false. And #9 probably is.

Creationists have written on all of them in detail. My summary will be brief. But it is worth mentioning a common feature through the comic. Creationists believe what they do because they read the Bible in a straightforward manner. They are what many would describe as literalists. Creationists take many of the statements in Genesis as narrative and historical. Though they do not think every verse in the Bible is literal. Creationists allow for a range of genres including fable, poetry, and apocalyptic. They recognise grammatical features such as hyperbole, generalisation, rhetoric, etc. What is problematic in the protagonist is that he refutes plain readings of Scripture by giving hyper-literal meanings to other passages. Including appealing to more poetical passages.

To the arguments.

Scientific theories by creationists are not science but propaganda. Creationism is not scientific.

Except that creationism is applying the scientific method to the world around us using different presuppositions. We assume that history is correct as recorded in the Bible and apply that to the world. The presuppositions of Evolutionists are just that. The evidence is the same, but we read it through different perspectives. And it matters what those perspectives are.

As an aside, much of what is called science is actually history. And the historical story of evolution is far more history than it is science. Forensic science is legitimate, but it is not operational science and should not be confused with it.

Creationism is not taught in the Bible.

It depends a little on what is meant here, but the idea that the world is currently ~6000 years old has a long history. It seems ridiculous that an idea that many men have concluded from Scripture over millennia is not suggested by Genesis. Now these interpreters could be mistaken, but only if you claim a straightforward reading is mistaken. This is a little ingenuous. You really have to show why this interpretation is incorrect rather than stating it is absent from the text. 

The Hebrew word "yom" means any time frame, not a normal day.

This is just plain false. It can mean a time frame longer than a usual day, much like the English word. But it has usual meaning and less common meanings. And its meaning without any contextual qualifiers is that of a normal length day.


The earth bringing forth fruit is not God doing a miracle thus the time must be longer than a day.

The logic seems to be that God told the earth to bring forth fruit thus the length of the day must include that time that it takes for a fruit tree to grow fruit. This is utter nonsense. The idea that this is not a miracle because it is indirect is folly. Further, the same is said about the earth bringing forth animals and yet the earth does not normally do this directly or indirectly. Also, it is unlikely that the passage even says this. The earth is to bring forth trees which bear fruit.

God said, “Let the earth produce green plants that will bear seed—fruit trees bearing fruit in which there is seed—according to its kind, on the earth.” And it was so. And the earth brought forth green plants bearing seed according to its kind, and trees bearing fruit in which there was seed according to its kind.

Numbering "day" does not make it literal.

Except that it does. Hosea 6:2 is not an exception.

He will revive us after two days;
on the third day he will raise us up,
that we may live in his presence.

Even if this means a short time (rather than 2 and 3 days), it means this by virtue of a symbolic comparison. The literalness of the 2 and 3 days is needed so that there can be a figurative understanding of a short time. If "day" does not mean a literal day here, then where is the meaning of a short time? If the passage could mean 2 aeons and 3 aeons then the implied meaning is this will happen after an extremely long time.


Putting "evening and morning" does not make it literal.

This is an interesting argument because creationists do not say that evening and morning mean a 24-hour period (though it often does), rather they argue that the association of evening and morning with the term day makes the day literal. So the example of Psalm 90 is irrelevant. The use of evening and morning here is meant to imply a short time. Again, like in Hosea, it is this literal meaning which shows the Psalmist is claiming how short things are. Grass blossoms and withers in a day, meaning quickly. Similarly men, in God's sight, have short lives.

God referring to creating in 6 days and resting on one is not literal because we have other Sabbath patterns.

This gets things back to front. The example of the creation is an example for men to follow. It is a direct comparison. God did this and you do the same. God created in 6 days and rested on the 7th day therefore you are to work for 6 days and rest on one day. In Exodus the term "day" appears in the command and the example of God. Other Sabbaths such as Sabbaths of years are modeled on the week. There is not comparison of God working for 6 years. Rather the example of 6 on 1 off is the Sabbatical type. (And there is no Sabbath of months.)

The sun was not created on day 4 it appeared.

There can be a difference between "create" [bara] and "make" [asah] but one must be careful not to overly distinguish synonyms. It could mean appoint. It is questionable that the sun existed before this, although the parenthetical comment about making the stars could mean they were made either then or had been made earlier. One should be cautious about getting an exact chronology from Job. As mentioned the stars could have antedated the sun. Either way, "stars" in Job 38:7 is likely to poetically refer to angels.

Human death did not exist before the Fall, but animal death did.

It depends a little on what is meant by "animal." Humans did not die before the Fall. Prior to the Fall Adam and Eve had access to the Tree of Life and death was a result of the Fall. Humans were to eat plants. The fact that God also gave plants to the animals and birds is highly suggestive that carnivory is a result of the Fall. God can then provide for animals if they subsequently become carnivorous. He gave men meat after the Flood and yet we still see God's hand in this provision.

If the world is no longer very good then Romans 1:20 cannot be true.

For from the creation of the world, [God's] invisible attributes, both his eternal power and deity, are discerned clearly, being understood in the things created, so that they are without excuse.

This claim seems a little odd. If the world is no longer very good (because of the Fall and animals eating other animals), then why would this passage not be true? We can see these attributes of God in the world even if it is broken. Why do we need a perfect created world to see God's handiwork?

God cannot give us meat if carnivory comes from sin.

The argument seems to be that if God gives us something then it must be good. If it is good then it cannot be a result of the Fall which came from sin. But this seems like an unusual argument as we know God gave us meat after the Flood and we know that God only gave plants before the Fall. Carnivory was something that occurred after creation. It was not how things were set up when God made humans. So it must have occurred for a reason.

The protagonist argues that carnivory cannot be due to sin because God gives us meat, but God can bring about good from evil. There are many examples in Scripture where something good comes from evil: Joseph and his brothers, Hosea and his wife, water from a rock, salvation through the murder of Jesus.

God fixes laws so creation cannot change.

Thus says the Lord: "If I have not established my covenant with day and night and the fixed order of heaven and earth, then I will reject the offspring of Jacob and David my servant and will not choose one of his offspring to rule over the offspring of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. For I will restore their fortunes and will have mercy on them."

This says nothing about whether creation can change as a result of the Fall. And we know that it did because Paul tells us:

For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until now.

If creation changed with Adam then the gospel is diminished.

This takes us away from creationism into whether God foreknew or caused the Fall. Regardless, the Fall occurred and God promised a redeemer in the curse. The idea that a plan B diminishes anything for God is not borne out in Scripture. It is frequently the case that God does even greater things when we fail.

Creationism stared with John Milton's Paradise Lost.

Mention is made of Milton and 4 other creationists. Milton wrote Paradise Lost in 1667 and 1674. It is almost certain that any concepts related to creationism reflected not only his beliefs but those of Christians during that time. No mention is made of many other creationists such as Kepler (1571–1630) or Newton (1642–1727). Creationism clearly antedates Paradise Lost.

Creationism is dangerous because when Christians come to understand it is false they abandon Christianity.

There are several reasons to question this. Firstly, there are a large number of beliefs which are held by a variety of Christians around the world. Many who change what they think about a particular doctrine do not abandon the faith. Most of us have modified at least one aspect of what we think about various Christian doctrines. Do we all abandon the faith every time we modify a belief?

Secondly, it is the experience of many creationists that Christians who have abandoned evolution they were taught and embraced a creationist understanding of Genesis and the Bible are even more enthusiastic about he things of God. It was the theory of evolution that hamstrung their faith.

Thirdly, what are we to say of other Christian beliefs that act as a stumbling block? Professed Christians abandon Christianity claiming that they have come to realise one of their beliefs is wrong. Do we deny the virgin birth, the coming of Jesus in the flesh, the love of God, because if someone abandons this belief they could end up abandoning Christianity? The truth is that people abandon Christianity for a range of reasons, not all because of struggles with doctrine. Even so, someone who wishes to walk away will often blame a belief he struggles with. (This may even be the case when the real reason is that he struggles with a sin that he does not wish to abandon.)

Regardless, it is important to believe the truth. If creationism in true then it is better to teach it in the church and better for Christians to hold this doctrine. Irrespective of what happens to men who abandon a true doctrine, we are better to think rightly about the world, the Bible, and God.

Conclusion

I find it interesting that creationism is portrayed as dangerous in this cartoon. It seems to me that the author rejects a straightforward reading of Genesis but in doing so he reveals that he does not understand the rest of Scripture that he brings to his defense.

Cosmological argument

Alexander Pruss proposes 2 versions of the cosmological argument:

1. There are no infinite causal regresses or causal loops.
2. Every ordinary entity has a cause.
3. So, there is an extraordinary entity.

And

1. There is a causal explanation why there are any ordinary entities.
2. Causal explanations are not circular.
3. So, there is an extraordinary entity.

Equivocating on law

The comparison between laws of nature and moral law is a useful one however I fear there is a degree of equivocation that goes ignored.

We have a creator who is also a lawgiver; we are to love the Lord our God and our neighbours, amongst other things. We are moral creatures are are to submit to our maker. He requires of us and we do best to obey him. As such these laws are rules we are to commanded to obey; ordinances that are prescriptive: you shall do, you shall not do; you may, you may not. As free creatures we are able to acquiesce, or not. That is, there is the possibility of disobedience.

The ancients applied the idea of standards to the natural world. Our world is orderly because our God is orderly and immutable. God made the world a certain way and the planets continue to orbit the sun which continues to emit its light. Matter and energy obey their laws, but such laws (in as much that they are correct interpretations of nature) are descriptive not prescriptive.

In the case of men we study habits and generalise common behaviours as "laws": descriptions of how people tend to act. But the descriptive law that thirsty people seek out drink is distinct from the prescriptive law that says it is wrong to steal someone's drink.

Perhaps the physical laws are rules, and matter cannot but obey its maker. We have laws to describe matter doing what God prescribes matter to do. Though some laws may be corollaries of fundamental constructs. God created space and time and matter and light, but the inverse square law may just reflect the geometry of 3 dimensional Euclidean space: a constant force will be diluted if it acts from a point out into 3 dimensions but the inverse square of the distance. Now it seems that the natural world could have been otherwise in which case the laws would have been different. But the physical laws would reflect how God intended that world would act. But even if physical laws are in some way prescriptive from God's perspective, moral commands are prescriptive in a different way. They are commands to free creatures that can love and obey, or refuse to. We must be careful we do not let the analogy of physical law to moral law get away on us.

Harris begs the question

Sam Harris posted this on Facebook.

No rational atheist (or “New Atheist”) holds religion accountable for every idiotic or unethical thing religious people do. We blame a religion only for what its adherents do as a direct result of its doctrines, such as opposing gay marriage or killing apostates.

Atheism has no doctrines. It does not demand that a person do anything, or refrain from doing anything, on the basis of his unbelief. Consequently, to know that someone is an atheist is to know almost nothing about him—apart from the fact that he does not accept the unwarranted claims of any religion.

Atheism is simply the condition of not believing in Poseidon, Thor, or any of the thousands of dead gods that lie in the graveyard we call mythology. To that extent, everyone knows exactly what it is to be an atheist—he has simply added the god of Abraham to the list of the dead.

If a belief in astrology were causing people to go berserk—to deny medical care to their children or to murder unbelievers—many of us would speak and write about the dangerous stupidity of astrology. This would not be bigotry or intolerance on our part. It would be a plea for basic human sanity. And that is all that an atheist’s criticism of religious tribalism and superstition ever is.

If you understand this, you will recognize any attempt to blame atheism for specific crimes, great or small, for what it is: A fresh act of religious demagoguery.

Harris is saying that failure to believe in God is a single item of belief that does not have uniform consequences for all people who hold this belief. However this is not true. Certain other beliefs and behaviours are logically consequent for any single belief. While this may not be universally the case for every person, it is the case for groups of people who hold a belief. Do other beliefs and behaviours logically follow from any particular belief? Yes they do. Atheism may have no other doctrines but certain things follow such as the idea that consciousness has a naturalistic explanation.

More importantly is the assumption of atheism here. If atheism happens to be true then atheists who are nasty may be just nasty, but not because of atheism. Consider the alternative assumption though, that theism is true. If theism is true and there is a God, a creator who owns us and we are accountable to. What does this say about those who do not believe in this God. The position of atheism in this scenario is not neutral, it is a position disbelieving the truth. It is also a position of refusing to acknowledge God's authority. Disobedience to God in other areas is also more likely, especially the more vehemently an atheist rejects his creator.

Assuming no God, the atheist is more likely to have a specific set of views and behaviours (based on his atheism) than the person who believes in God. Assuming there is a God, then the atheist is more likely to rebel against God in many ways.

The laws of nature

This article puts together several ideas that I have been pondering over the years but have not written much about or with such clarity. Doyle covers important issues such as:

• The limited relationship between physical laws and judicial law
• The moral nature of judicial law
• The descriptive but non-prescriptive nature of physical law
• How physical law represents God's general upholding of the universe
• How miracles represent God's special activity in the universe
• That miracles are impossible is a specious argument
• That the term "methodological naturalism" is polemical, and unhelpful

Concerning methodological naturalism and science, Doyle not only notes that the term "methodological naturalism" invokes philosophical naturalism ("naturalism" being the shortened form) because they sound similar, methodological naturalism is not even accurate because naturalism does not imply regularity—why should we expect an ordered universe? I think a more useful term for science is empirical induction. Such a term would make scientific fields much narrower though increase clarity. Much of cosmology, palaeontology, archaeology and many other disciplines would come under the umbrella of inferred history.

I would like to add a thought on law. It is not clear than the physical laws are informational rather than just geometrical. The descriptions of such laws are informational, but the laws themselves may not be. I think that they are but that they have low information content. High information content occurs in designed objects such as flowers and people. And morality, while containing information, is more than information. That is, we have matter (and related qualities such as space and time) and the physical laws that describe how they behave; we have message which represents complex objects; and we have morals which specify how conscious objects are to behave.

An excellent article that I wish I had written.

Defining arguments away—the distorted language of secularism

by Shaun Doyle

Abstract

One of the means that secularists have used to achieve dominance in the culture over the last 250 years has been the manipulation of language. Key terms have been modified, and new terms coined, which slant the ‘rules of engagement’ between Christianity and secularism against Christianity. Three terms in particular: ‘natural law’, ‘miracle’, and ‘methodological naturalism’ have been affected. If we do not expose and correct this sophistry, an honest debate is not possible. At root, these issues reflect the clash between worldviews that must ultimately be accepted for reasons outside of science.

‘The laws of nature’—confusion and caution

One of the most common ways to talk about well-established scientific ideas is to refer to them as ‘the laws of nature’, ‘natural law/s’, or ‘scientific law/s’. These phrases conjure up notions of an orderly universe, and convey the idea that science can teach us much about the universe. The notion of ‘law’ can be a helpful metaphor for understanding the regularity we see in how the universe works, but it is just a metaphor.

One thing true of all metaphors is that they are only helpful to a point before they break down. They do so because, from the point of view of formal logic, all metaphors break the law of non-contradiction. When they are pushed too far, different things end up equated in ways that amount to false statements. For example, saying “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s gentleness equates the physical softness of the teddy bear with the gentle character of Mark, which amounts to saying that Mark has a gentle character. However, saying that “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s physical makeup does not work because Mark, a human, is clearly not made of stuffing! Not all the attributes of teddy bears can be attributed to Mark, and vice versa. This doesn’t invalidate the use of metaphors because everyone intuitively knows this, and we don’t use a metaphor to say that two different things are logically identical—only that they are identical in some significant and relevant property in a particular sense.

‘Natural law’ is itself a metaphor for the regularities of the physical world drawn from the concept of human law. Moreover, it’s a natural metaphor to draw, given a sovereign moral Lawgiver who also upholds His creation in an orderly way (figure 1). The regularities of nature are so regular that they seem to reflect some principle that the matter itself cannot transgress, like how people cannot transgress a human law. However, the notions of obedience and transgression are themselves concepts that most properly apply to the behaviour of moral agents—a concept which does not apply to inanimate matter and energy. That is one of many ways that human laws are not identical to ‘natural laws’, and presents an area where the metaphor breaks down.

Are ‘natural laws’ prescriptive?

However, as people jettisoned the Bible and its doctrine of providence and came to accept a ‘fuzzy positivism’ in its place from the 19^th century onwards, many people seemed to forget that the notion of ‘natural law’ is just a metaphor. Because of this, and that the metaphor is so fitting, we have forgotten to pay attention to those areas where the regularities of nature do not correspond to human laws. Failure to recognize the metaphorical nature of ‘natural law’ has brought undue confusion over how the world actually works. The problem is that people often conceive of ‘the laws of nature’ as materially equivalent to human laws. If someone does what human law forbids, it is described as ‘breaking’ or ‘violating’ the law. People then apply this same notion of law to ‘the laws of nature’, and consider a miracle in the same way they consider an illegal act—as if some precept has been ‘broken’ or ‘violated’. The biggest mistake people make when they equate ‘natural law’ and human law is that they make natural law prescriptive. However, there are two major errors with understanding the concept of ‘natural law’ like this.

First, when people think of ‘natural laws’ as prescriptive, there is in fact a subtle but significant difference in what ‘prescriptive’ connotes in comparison to human laws. Human laws are prescriptive messages—they are coded information. Human laws are not inextricably bound to any given physical form—one can communicate the law “you shall not murder” in any human language, and in numerous different physical formats (e.g. writing on a piece of paper, Morse code, speech, etc.). Moreover, a human law cannot render the act of murder physically impossible. Herein lies the difference—when ‘natural law’ is seen as prescriptive, it is not conceived of as merely coded information, but is something materially able to make certain states of affairs physically impossible. However, ascribing ‘natural law’ a tangible existence like this commits the fallacy of reification, which treats abstract concepts as concrete objects. ‘Natural law’ is an abstract concept—it is coded information, like human laws, which formally describes regular patterns observed in nature. As such, ‘natural laws’ have no more power to cause the regularities of nature than a redraw of a map of New Zealand can change the physical coastline.

Second, although human laws and ‘natural laws’ are both coded information, they are different types of messages. Human laws prescribe what people should and should not do, e.g. the law forbidding murder. The law itself says nothing about how people actually act—it is a command, not a statement of fact. ‘The laws of nature’ are different: they are formal descriptions of regular patterns observed in nature—i.e. they are statements of fact. They either correspond with reality or they do not. However, it is meaningless to apply the notion of correspondence with reality to a human law such as forbidding murder, because it is an imperative command, not a statement of fact. Conversely, the statement: “murder is ethically wrong” is a statement of (ethical) fact, and is generally implied to form the basis for the law forbidding murder. This means ‘the laws of nature’ are not formally prescriptive, and are more accurately seen as descriptive concepts.

Read the rest here

Evidence for God more accessible than evidence from science

One atheist complaint about God is why is the evidence for him not clearer? Why do we have to search so hard for it? Should it not be obvious?

I actually think the evidence for God is clearer than what is claimed. However Keith Ward raises an interesting point, especially given the atheist penchant for science.

As to the question of evidence, I think that is rather like asking why we have to try so hard to discover scientific truth. Why did God not just tell us about quantum physics, and make it all obvious? There is a truth about the physical world, but it is extremely hard to discover. Part of being human is having to learn for ourselves, after taking many false paths and blind alleys, what the world is like. (Chapter 8, Why There Almost Certainly Is a God)

The irony Ward identifies is remarkable. Scientific evidence is not obvious prior to the fact. But even more damning is that the scientific method was not particularly obvious. It was late on the scene and only originated in a single culture. And even now when we understand how the scientific method operates, unravelling the workings of the world takes considerable effort.

What's more, evidences for God—the design argument and the moral argument—were known about centuries before science. Many cultures understood this evidence for God for millennia; yet the scientific method, which so enamours the materialists, took a long time to be identified. Further, the development of the philosophy of God (theology) proceeded significantly while men struggled to progress in natural philosophy (science) due to their unwarranted devotion to Aristotle.

It seems that the evidence for God is indeed much more accessible to man than science.

Atheism's religion

Is atheism a religion? Is evolutionism a religion? Is secularism a religion?

Subscribers to various positions try to prejudice their own beliefs by claiming that religious beliefs should be excluded from the public square, or that such beliefs represent a conflict of interest, or a bias—often implying an unacceptable bias.

Of course if religion is (reasonably) defined as belief in a deity or, more broadly, the supernatural, then materialism is not a religion. Unfortunately for the materialist he is not off the hook. Firstly the debate is over truth. And if God exists, as the majority of the world has believed since creation till now, then the premises of the atheist are false and his conclusions are more likely to be errant.

Even ignoring this, the relegation of religion to second tier prominence is unjustifiable. What is it that people believe? It is their worldview. Consistent or not, events are interpreted according to an underlying belief structure. It is not more logical to justify a course of action based on considerations that deliberately deny divinity rather than affirming it.

One may categorise a worldview by topic. Say, how does one view economics or philosophy? Within such a system the atheist has a view on theology. His claim is atheism, the Christian's claim is theism. Other particular worldviews include pantheism.

The atheist wishes to allow his denial of theism to influence his views, yet deny his theology (atheism) shut him out of the marketplace of ideas; the very reason he gives for banning the theist. He labels a theistic worldview "religion," which is enough to disparage ideas influenced by it, but somehow not have the same effect on areligious reasoning. He wants to eat and keep his cake.

Some atheist and evolutionist thinkers are more aware of the influence of worldview, and can see how such premises affect their ideas in ways analogous to religion. From their mouths....

Hubert Yockey (1916–), evolutionist. Journal of Theoretical Biology (1977), doi:10.1016/0022-5193(77)90044-3.

One must conclude that, contrary to the established and current wisdom a scenario describing the genesis of life on earth by chance and natural causes which can be accepted on the basis of fact and not faith has not yet been written.

Boyce Rensberger, evolutionist. How the World Works.

The fact is that scientists are not really as objective and dispassionate in their work as they would like you to think. Most scientists first get their ideas about how the world works not through rigorously logical processes but through hunches and wild guesses. As individuals, they often come to believe something to be true long before they assemble the hard evidence that will convince somebody else that it is. Motivated by faith in his own ideas and a desire for acceptance by his peers, a scientist will labor for years knowing in his heart that his theory is correct but devising experiment after experiment whose results he hopes will support his position.

Richard Lewontin (1929–), evolutionist. The New York Review of Books (1997).

We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfil many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is an absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door.

John Dunphy, humanist. The Humanist (1983).

I am convinced that the battle for humankind’s future must be waged and won in the public school classroom by teachers who correctly perceive their role as the proselytizers of a new faith: a religion of humanity that recognizes and respects the spark of what theologians call divinity in every human being. These teachers must embody the same selfless dedication as the most rabid fundamentalist preachers, for they will be ministers of another sort, utilizing a classroom instead of a pulpit to convey humanist values in whatever subject they teach, regardless of the educational level—preschool day care or large state university. The classroom must and will become an arena of conflict between the old and the new—the rotting corpse of Christianity, together with all its adjacent evils and misery, and the new faith of humanism … .

Michael Ruse (1940–), agnostic.

Evolution, akin to religion, involves making certain a priori or metaphysical assumptions, which at some level cannot be proven empirically.

Classification of knowledge

Mortimer Adler

Mortimer Adler classified knowledge in the 1960s in this manner.

1. Investigative|Synthetic|General = Operational science
2. Investigative|Synthetic|Particular = Historical science
3. Non-investigative|Synthetic|General = Philosophy 1st order
4. Non-investigative|Analytic|General = Mathematics

• Investigative (empirical) means that the tests are done on the world.
• Non-investigative means that ideas are cognitive and common to man.

• Synthetic means that these ideas are potentially falsifiable based on experience.
• Analytic means that it is not falsifiable based on experience.

• General means that the discovery is a global truth.
• Particular means that a specific event is being described.

Why are there 4 rather than 8 categories? 3 concepts with 2 options, 2³ = 8.

1. Investigative|Synthetic|General
2. Investigative|Synthetic|Particular
3. Investigative|Analytic|General
4. Investigative|Analytic|Particular
5. Non-investigative|Synthetic|General
6. Non-investigative|Synthetic|Particular
7. Non-investigative|Analytic|General
8. Non-investigative|Analytic|Particular

However, Investigative cannot be Analytic. If something is Investigative it should be falsifiable. If it is not falsifiable then investigative work is pointless, and thus it is Non-investigative. This excludes #3 and #4.

And, Non-investigative knowledge cannot be particular. If it is knowledge common to all men, then it is knowledge that is generalisable. This excludes #6 and #8.

We are left with the original 4 categories.

The interesting thing about these categories is that philosophers rate Non-investigative knowledge as more foundational than Investigative knowledge. And if one thinks about this, it makes sense. Investigative knowledge relies on the truth of Non-investigative knowledge. Scientists can see that scientific theory is subservient to mathematics. You cannot say that the theory of gravity is true unless you also hold that the mathematics which is used to describe the theory is also true.

Note that analytic knowledge is not falsifiable. This is because it is derived formally (deductively). One starts with several axioms and, assuming they are true, the rest follows. Mathematical theorems are not accepted true unless every step can be confirmed to be true. Several theories remain unresolved because a mathematician has not solved it. And once it is solved (and confirmed there are no errors) then it cannot subsequently be disproved. 2 + 3 = 5 remains true forever. No new discovery could disprove this.

Note the distinction between operational and historical science (I have previously discussed this). Operational science identifies global truths such as the conservation of energy. This has been well documented, but could potentially be disproved. Historical science will make statements about specific previous events such as when the Polynesians migrated into the Pacific. Further investigation could challenge the accepted norm (or confirm it).

So what of 1st order philosophy? Why should Non-investigative synthetic knowledge take priority?

This is because it is foundational to both science and mathematics. There are several things that man holds true that can only be described as self-evident. They seem true, and most people hold them to be true, but how does one prove them to be true?

Examples include self-identity, and the law of non-contradiction. How does one prove that

• A = A; or
• A ≠ ¬A

We also hold other things to be self-evidently true such as the reliability of reason, or the universality of physical laws: the idea that repeating an experiment will lead to the same result (all other things being equal and within the margin of error).

So Non-investigative knowledge is the most foundational. 1st order philosophy primarily from whence we get our axioms, and mathematics secondarily as it is deductively certain.

Investigative knowledges are less foundational. Both rely on the Non-investigative knowledges.

Inerrancy and belief structures

J.P. Moreland addresses inerrancy in his article The Rationality of Belief in Inerrancy in the Trinity Journal 7.1 (Spring 1986): 75-86. He has some interesting thoughts on why occasion difficulties with the text should not lead one to abandon inerrancy. Rather a less plausible inerrant reconstruction of a difficult text may be rationally preferred over a more plausible errant reconstruction if one otherwise has good reason to believe in inerrancy

An interpretation of a problem passage that harmonizes it with another text, and thus preserves inerrancy, may not be as rational as an interpretation that admits an error in the text, if one only considers this particular problem in isolation from other epistemically relevant considerations. But if one considers the depth of ingression of inerrancy as well, then the rationality of preserving belief in inerrancy in one’s noetic structure (as opposed to denying it and having to readjust a large part of one’s structure) can justify suspending judgment or believing a harmonization.

That a person does not change his entire belief structure every time he gains new information is not irrational

The defender of inerrancy is not being irrational in calling for suspension of judgment, etc. because of the depth of ingression of belief in inerrancy. At the very least, critics of the rationality of inerrancy should consider this before they criticize as irrational the various attempts to harmonize passages and the like.

The article as more useful for its arguments about the nature of belief as it is for its defence of inerrancy.

Such refusal to modify one's belief with minor unexplainable facts does not mean that one's belief can never change. We know that our knowledge is limited. Contrary evidence may appear contrary on the surface, yet we may lack even further information which in fact harmonises a rogue fact with our belief system. But enough contrary evidence can eventually modify our belief structure. This seems similar to Thomas Kuhn's argument about paradigm shifts in science. Moreland draws some parallels with scientific thinking.

So how much contrary evidence is required to overturn a belief structure. Well it depends on how central such a belief is, not so much in terms of conviction, but how many other beliefs are affected. Moreland addresses this earlier in the article, but also the problem that the criteria for rejection of held beliefs is not well defined by individuals.

It could be objected that nowhere have I stated any criteria for knowing when there would be enough problems with inerrancy to justify giving it up. Thus, I cannot rationally claim to know that inerrancy is true.

...As an example, consider a puzzle from the ancient Greeks, known as the sorites problem. Given a small heap of wheat, can I get a large heap by adding one grain? It seems not, for how could one go from a small to a large heap by merely adding one grain. But then it seems that one could add grains of wheat to a small heap and never reach a large heap.

Consider another puzzle. If one gradually changes the shade of a color from red to orange, can one tell when the color changes from red to orange? Probably not. But in the absence of such a criterion, how can I know when I see red or orange?

The problem with both puzzles is this: they assume that in the absence of clear criteria for borderline cases, one cannot have knowledge of clear cases. Without being able to judge when the heap becomes large, I can never know that it is large. Without being able to judge when the color changes to orange, I can never know that it is orange. But the fact is, I can know a large heap or an orange color even if I have no criteria.

I am not dismissing criteria altogether. Indeed, they are important in an overall theory of rationality. But I do not need criteria in all cases to know something.

I would add it depends on whether the new belief system which explains the rogue data also explains data in the old system. Which system if held to be true makes the most sense of all the data and has the least anomalies.

Distilling the truth

Belief systems have presuppositions, and facts are then interpreted in light of those presuppositions. Of course facts can challenge such presuppositions, but frequently auxiliary hypotheses are added, which are then disregarded or changed so that the underlying theory stays intact. This is a reasonable approach, and everyone does it to a degree, but if the presuppositions are fundamentally incorrect then the theory will have significant error, and this tendency (to focus on modifying auxiliary hypotheses) means the wrong foundation may never be changed. Thus claims must be distilled, with facts being accepted and theory being questioned. The difficulty being that the 2 are frequently entwined, and rejection of the theory is perceived as rejection of the facts.

This applies to every field, mathematics, the hard sciences, behavioural studies, politics, economics, theology,...

I hold physics and chemistry in high regard because their foundations are solidly Christian. I subscribe to Christian theologies but reject Eastern theologies/ philosophies because of their rejection of objective reason and objective truth which I see as foundational to Christian philosophy. I reject some economic theory but accept those that are consistent with Christian teaching. I am not a big fan of psychology and treat it with a significant caution. It is not that one cannot or should not study human nature, that seems to be a legitimate and accessible field. Rather I am suspicious of it because its foundations are not biblically derived, and probably anti-biblical.

Lest one gain the impression that I do not think about my positions let me state that I think more about the positions that I hold than I do not. I spend significantly more time thinking about the intricacies of minor Christian theological doctrines than I do about major Eastern religious doctrines.

It is doing this that helps me better identify the fact theory divide. I am fully at liberty to take my information from people that do not hold orthodox belief, but because they are not of Christian persuasion, I am aware that they may misunderstand what they know or discover, or how they reason about such knowledge. Not that Christians are immune to such, but many hopefully start with correct presuppositions, that is truthful axioms, underlying beliefs that correspond to reality.

This is a good reason to stay grounded in the Bible. In a pluralistic society many ideas compete for our allegiance. We need to be cautious about 2 things, rejecting truth because it comes from a non-Christian source, and accepting falsehood because it seems to correspond to experience. It may be that we accept truthful facts that are married to wrong philosophy and the 2 are packaged together. We take on the fact which appears (and is) true, but inappropriately accept false philosophy. Or perhaps recognise the false philosophy and rightly reject it but inappropriately discard the fact attached.

The illegitimacy of anti-supernatural causation

My recent post led to some discussion, mainly in response to my opposition in defining science as methodological naturalism. I think the previous use of the term Natural Philosophy was adequate for the time. It made it clear that it was the study of natural phenomena without the baggage of additional metaphysics that are unnecessary to the practice of science. The subsequent addition of historical science to operational science to encompass all "science" makes short descriptions more difficult.

My contention is that forcing singular past events to be natural (that is not supernatural) is artificial (not genuine) and arbitrary (not determined by necessity); in that if God did make an object, methodological naturalism would prefer the false explanation that man made it over the true explanation that God did. david w states

The difference is artificial if there can be evidence for supernatural causation. How... [can] we know if God made a house?

This is putting the cart before the horse. One cannot argue philosophically that God does not exist thus he cannot make anything thus nothing is made by God. One can argue philosophically the case for and against God, but if there is empirical evidence otherwise, that must be taken into consideration.

To ask what such evidence is for God, but deny that evidence is even possible within one's philosophy is disingenuous.

If God exists and he made man, and is at least as capable as man then he can make anything man can make. It does not matter whether or not we can identify a particular object is made by God, the fact is this is theoretically possible. And a definition that excludes God from producing something when it possible that he could, and thus God didn't, even if he did, is fallacious.

I think there is reason to think that God made some objects. But definitive evidence, or even any evidence, that God made something is not necessary to allow that possibility. We allow for that possibility in other situations, such as an unknown culture, or the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence.

It must be recognised that we are looking at effects, thus inferring the source. Extensive knowledge, or any knowledge, about the source is not required beforehand. It is in studying the effect that we theorise about the source.

Establishing the model before doing the maths

My recent post on information led to a call for a precise definition of what is meant by information. This request is eminently reasonable. I have yet to give an exact mathematical definition, or even an exact philosophical one. The reason is that "information" has a variety of meanings to different people; and the association with computing and information technology colours people's thinking.

Consider gravity. My understanding is that ideas about gravity around the time of Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton changed the way people thought about motion. Prior to then it was obvious that objects fell to the ground, but the Aristotelian rationale for such motion was that (some) objects tend toward the centre of the earth. And observations would support this claim. Post-Aristotelian physics described the same phenomena, but for a different reason: massive objects attract each other. The stone moves toward the earth, and the earth moves toward the stone; but the earth imperceptibly because of its immense size. Same observation (as much as perceptible) but different explanation.

The old theorem explains pendulums better. Pendulums tend to the centre of the earth so they stop after a time, not doing so immediately because the weight is moving when it gets to the lowest point. Newton's theory needs friction to explain the same observation; one could argue Newton is less parsimonious. However Newton was shown correct over time. And his theory was well defined, gave predictions, and was generalisable to the heavens.

My diversion was to highlight that the differences between the two approaches did not require them to be rigorously defined. The mass-attraction concepts antedated the maths by a significant amount of time; Newton had to invent maths for his theory! But a philosophical discussion on the merits of objects tending to the centre of the earth versus objects attracting is still very possible.

Similarly, it is possible to discuss other topics in general before rigour is attained, including information.

Information is a non-material concept that contains instructions thru language.

I use the term instruction somewhat broadly including being informed, not just commanded. That is, meaning of some form exists.

Critique of my Young Earth Creationism post

My post on young earth creationism raised several responses here and at Vox Popoli where it was originally posted. See also here and here. As well as a response on theologyonline.

These responses suggest some further aspects need to be discussed.

It is important for me to clarify what I was trying to do. I deliberately chose to give a scientific/ philosophical defence rather than a scriptural one. I thought it would interest a broader audience. And it is important to realise the issues in this debate are philosophical.

There were 2 main points I wanted to make.

1. There is a fundamental difference between operational and historical science. Thus historical science can be challenged by types of knowledge (such as testimony and documentary knowledge) in a way that operational science cannot be challenged.
2. Evidence against YEC that presupposes evolution is true is invalid. (In fact evidence against any theory presuming a priori that it is false is invalid).

So if people came away unconvinced yet more aware of their own preconceptions, and they could see that YEC is a valid philosophy that can be considered—and either accepted or rejected—then I am content with this.

The main complaints were the lack of positive evidence for YEC and the lack of exegetical support given for the YEC position.

Addressing the lack of positive evidence first. This complaint is reasonable, especially given my title. However the reasons given above are why I was cautious to discuss specific issues. Until these issues are dealt with, debates are frequently at cross purposes. YECists are forever pointing out the assumptions that non-YECists hold.

I had considered that too much discussion on the merits of, say, helium diffusion dating (and why evolutionists disagree with it) would miss the point that evolutionists are assuming ancient dates because they have a prior commitment to such, and thus they are judging other dating methods by their agreement, or not, to radiometric dating. Whereas my position is that the questioning of all dating methods is legitimate. As it was, the debates in the comments still frequently assumed the validity of old earth dogma.

Do YECists not also have a prior commitment to younger dates? Yes, they do. But they admit their commitment to a biblical timeframe. Evolutionists frequently deny their prior commitment and pretend they are somehow more objective, when in fact they are choosing the clocks that suit their purposes.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of more positive evidence of a young earth would have improved the post and it may be something I could address at a later stage.

My choice to avoid a scriptural defence on why the Bible demands YEC was deliberate, as mentioned. I laid out the basic beliefs for the benefit of those who did not know what they were; to clarify what YECists believe and also what they do not believe despite accusations to the contrary. However the responses and a conversation I had with a friend a few weeks ago has suggested that I should probably give the scriptural reasons for the YEC position at some stage.

A defence of Young Earth Creationism

Young Earth Creationism (YEC) is multifaceted. It is a metaphysical framework; a scripturally informed philosophy of nature which includes a scientific model that seeks to evaluate and explain the world. Thus it touches a variety of topics. There are limits in what can be accomplished with a short blog post, but I think that some clarity can be brought to the debate, specifically identifying the source of the conflict and the domain in which the debate needs to occur.

Antagonism to YEC is predominantly philosophical, rooted in naturalism. Opposition to the YEC position is frequently made using suppositions antagonistic to YEC; the proof of error is therefore in the axioms not the conclusions.

YEC has a long history. It has been the predominant position throughout most of the history of the West, until the introduction of uniformitarian interpretations in the 18th and 19th century by the non-catastrophic geologists. These geologists influenced Darwin and although Darwin didn’t publish his theory till the 19th century, evolutionary-like philosophies have a much older history, somewhat similar ideas proposed by some Greek philosophers. And YECists have good company with the likes of scientists such as Kepler, Newton, Pasteur, and Maxwell. But the issue is not a tradition game or a numbers game, it is: Does YEC accurately describe reality?

The underlying reasons for specific YECist concepts are: the rules of logic as applied to the Bible and science, and the grammatical historical hermeneutic applied to the Bible. YECists take most of Genesis to be historical narrative including the creation, fall, and flood. They think that most occurrences of the word “day” in Genesis 1 mean a usual day because of contextual considerations.

YEC touches several fields including theology: hermeneutics, theodicy; philosophy: philosophy of science, logic; science: biology, genetics, palaeontology, astronomy, geology, climate, thermodynamics; information theory; archaeology; history. (Hermeneutics and logic would be better classified as fields that form YEC belief rather than result from it, as mentioned above).

I wish to cover the following about YEC

• What young earth creationists (YECists) do and do not believe;
• The nature of evidence and science; and
• A discussion focusing on a single aspect of YEC: the age of the earth.

What YEC is

YEC can be summarised as follows:

• The universe is not eternal, it was created by God who is external to the world, self existent, and eternal
• God created the world in 6 usual days
• Nature was corrupted by the Fall of Man
• The earth is about 6000 years old
• The earth was deluged by a global flood about 4500 years ago
• The Bible is inerrant and should be interpreted in a straightforward manner (according to genre)

There are several corollaries from this, though the specifics may vary. The creation model includes:

• Most of the sedimentary layers of rock and enclosed fossils that occur worldwide were formed during the Noachic Flood.
• The earth likely contained a single continent that broke up during or after the Flood
• There was a single ice-age caused by the post-Flood climate
• All land and air animals (of significant size) are descendants of the animals that were on the Ark
• Man has coexisted with all animals that have ever existed
• Natural selection (an analogue of artificial selection) occurs
• Speciation is rapid. It occurs through allelic separation, genetically induced variation, or detrimental mutation (loss of genetic information).
• There are genetic limits to the amount of speciation, diversification, adaption, or breeding that can occur
• Information content of the biosphere cannot increase. Matter cannot create information.
• Information is always the result of an intelligence
• Loss of information can mean improved fitness within a specific environment, that is loss of function can result in improved likelihood of survival.
• Lost information cannot be recovered without reintroduction of the same information (save trivial examples) by breeding or design
• Archaeological artefacts post-date the Flood, which limits their age to a maximum of 4500 years

There are several accusations that are charged against YEC which proponents of YEC do not support or promote; such as

• God (or Satan) created the fossils in situ as a test of our faith
• God created things with false appearance of age (this needs qualification)
• Animals were created how they look now and no new species of animals have developed
• Entropy was a result of and did not exist before the Fall of Man
• The earth is flat

On evidence and science

While much could be written in defence of the specific YEC beliefs, discussion can be difficult if foundational issues are not identified.

Modern science was originally a systematised process of categorising our observations to make further inferences and reduce our observations to consistent laws. While hypothesis testing is a usual method, data gathering to create a hypothesis was seen as legitimate. Thus, multiple measurements of the planets led to Kepler proposing elliptical orbits, which could then be further tested. Francis Bacon is frequently credited with formulating the scientific method. Written as:

observation → induction → hypothesis → test hypothesis by experiment → proof/disproof → knowledge

Popper’s falsifiability criterion has had a clarifying influence on the understanding of scientific theories. Therefore negative evidence was seen as disproving a theory whilst positive evidence is merely consistent with a theory, not proof of such.

Notice that Bacon’s definition is necessarily limited to observable phenomena. This is classic operational science (also called empirical science), which helps us infer laws about things that are demonstrable and repeatable. This is an enormously important distinction that frequently goes unrecognised. In contrast, inferences about previous events are not repeatable. This does not mean that the scientific method cannot be employed, rather that it is limited in what it can say.

Consider the science of identifying a criminal via a DNA sample. This science is not being done to discover how DNA binds to itself (i.e. hydrogen bonding), it is attempting to establish an event such as a murder.

So a fragment of the DNA is identified and then matched to a specific person. The samples can be run several times and in several different ways; both the forensic sample and the suspects’ samples. And we can establish that the forensic sample and a suspect sample match. This part of the process is operational science.

However establishing a particular suspect as the murderer is not observable. We cannot do an experiment several times to show that he did indeed murder the victim. Intrinsically it is impossible; the event happened in the past. And even if we establish he is capable of murder, it doesn’t prove he committed this particular murder. This kind of science is called historical science.

It has been claimed that scientists do not discriminate this way when practising science. This may be the case. When one does historical science there is usually an element of operational science as seen in this example (though the converse is not necessarily true). But whether actual scientists discriminate like this is irrelevant to the philosophy of science, what matters is whether this distinction exists. And it clearly exists because a methodology that relies on repeatability cannot be applied to singular past events.

The reason for this discussion is to show that historical science competes with other evidences in a way that operational science does not. If I claim my house is so high, I can invite you to measure it. Testimonial evidence doesn’t play a part. We don’t ask a range of people their opinion as to what they think my house height is. 3 measurements by several engineers using differing methods that all agree trump the opinion of a dozen opinions and guesses. This is not the case with historical science.

Returning to our murder investigation with DNA sampling, all we have established is that a suspect shares a DNA fingerprint with a crime scene sample. This may be because it is a limited test, say a portion of DNA with a limited number of polymorphisms. Even if we can be certain the DNA matches by performing adequate sequencing, there may be a identical twin brother we do not know about. Or the DNA may have come from the suspect, but at another time; a meeting earlier in the day. Now I am not trying to imply that DNA testing is inaccurate or inappropriate for criminal investigation, I am illustrating how its use in proving crime is intrinsically different from operational science.

Testimony of others meant little in the height of my house, but it means a great deal in identifying a murderer. Not because murder is more important that house height, but because it is not testable in the way that heights and widths of objects are. A claim that the suspect has a twin brother is a competing claim against the DNA test. A claim that the suspect was seen elsewhere at the time of the murder is a competing claim. A claim that the blood type does not match despite the DNA matching is a competing claim.

Note that competing claims against historical science can be both scientific and non-scientific (eg. testimonial).

Also note that scientific claims do not automatically trump non-scientific claims. The testimony of a thousand witnesses is not overturned by a DNA match just because the latter is scientific. We weigh several competing claims and people will be variously convinced depending on how reliable they regard each piece of evidence.

YEC is a competing claim about the history of the world. It is predominantly a competing claim to the historical sciences of biological macro-evolution, abiogenesis, stellar evolution, and uniformitarian geology.

Some of the YEC disagreement with evolutionary theory is due to consideration of non-scientific fields such as documentary evidence. However much of the disagreement is from a competing but different historical science. For example, consider the age of the earth.

How old is the earth?

YECists claim that the earth is about 6000 years old (though anything below 10000 years would fall into the same range). This is phenomenally different to the uniformitarian geological claim of 4.5 billion years. But note that any usual clock cannot calculate the time since the formation of the earth. We cannot go back, set our stop-watch, and mark off the aeons until now. We are considering a past event (or several past events). Compare this to measuring the time it takes a horse to run 1 km. We can do this measuring the starting and finishing time, and we can do this repeatedly, thus giving us the time (on average) the horse takes. For this we observe established clocks.

For past events we need to establish a historical clock, say radiometric-dating. Experiments can determine the amount of various isotopes of uranium and lead in a particular sample. One can do this part of the experiment over and over. We can satisfy ourselves to the limits of experimental accuracy that the sample contains a certain amount of uranium. This part of the investigation is operational science. All parties generally agree on the number of atoms identified in the sample and their ratio.

This ratio is then keyed into a formula based on a specific theory with a variety of assumptions to get a date for the formation of the mineral it was derived from. Now the theory is radioactive decay, which is reasonably well established, and an assumption is, say, no daughter isotope was present when the mineral formed.

The problem is that these calculations do not always give the answers that are thought to be correct (as established by other historical clocks or underlying evolutionary theory); so sub-theories are added, such as leaching of isotopes, addition of isotopes, incomplete melting at time of formation of mineral in rock. Creationists have also suggested a modification to the theory: the variation of decay half-life, though this modification is often disparaged.

Rather than discuss the merits of these sub-theories or, if you prefer, alteration of assumptions (all of which are reasonable); I would simply like to note that since radiometric dating is a historical science, there are competing claims.

There is the competing documentary claim, that the world was created 6000 years ago according to the Bible. This is a claim that YECists take seriously, much like the testimony of someone who witnessed an event. But documentary evidence is not restricted to the Bible. A variety of cultures have given an age of the earth much less than 4.5 billion years and more in keeping with the biblical figure, such as the Mayans and the Greeks. This particular competing claim is less convincing to agnostics and some theists, including some Christians. There are, however, other documentary claims and historical scientific claims that are worth mentioning.

Staying with radiometric dating, we have reliable documentary evidence for the age of some volcanic episodes. It so happens that rocks from lava flows within recent history that we know the real age of (via operational science) are consistently dated much older by radiometric dating, frequently hundreds of thousands of years or older. Explanations are offered up as to why this is the case, but the greater point is the model is reliably incorrect; it doesn’t matter how good this theory is or should be, the fact is the model doesn’t work.

If radiometric dating cannot get dates correct when we do know the true age, why should we trust it when we don’t know the true age?

We also have competing scientific claims. Radiometric dating is not the only historical clock. There are a large number of clocks. And even radiometric clocks vary depending on the isotope used.

Historical clocks often give maximum ages. This does not mean that the calculated age is the actual age, rather given the most favourable assumptions this is the longest a particular process has been going on. In constructing a clock based on sodium in the ocean, a maximum age would be established by assuming no sodium in the ocean when it formed, the lowest reasonable estimate for sodium influx, the highest reasonable estimate for sodium outflux, with the current concentration identified by measurements of salinity. The maximum age identified may not equal the true age, as the ocean may have started somewhat salty for example.

Within radiometric dating we have carbon dating competing with metal dating. Pretty much all carbon containing materials that have been tested contain carbon-14. This places an upper bound on their age. This includes diamonds embedded in rock supposedly millions of years old.

Other historical clocks include: diffusion rates of helium; decay of the magnetic field; decay of DNA and protein from dead organisms; elements in the ocean; recession of the moon, starlight travel from distant stars.

Objections can be raised against these other clocks (though the carbon-14 data is hard to surmount), but this is hardly the point. The point is that there are competing claims here. Radiometric dating of metals is favoured by the evolutionists because it gives a time frame needed for evolution. But it is one piece of historical scientific evidence. One person may find it convincing, but with so much riding against it, it is not unreasonable to weigh the other evidences heavier.

Summary

YEC is a worldview. It recognises a variety of evidences. It clearly understands the difference between operational and historical science. YECists do not dispute any significant operational scientific finding. Investigating past events is philosophically distinct from investigating repeatable events and YEC views past events differently, and in a way that I think makes more sense of the data.

YEC theory on the age of the earth is more parsimonious. It is consistent with much of the documentary evidence. It is also consistent with many of the historical scientific clocks. Modifications to the starting conditions and rates give ages consistent with a young earth, including radio-carbon. Radio-dates of metals less so, but these are known to be inaccurate, and YEC proposals concerning rates of decay may resolve other well recognised difficulties of radiometric dating. Ancient earth theory is unable to easily reconcile non-radiometric clocks or even radio-carbon clocks.

---

Thanks to Paladin and AndyM for their suggestions.

Does the Bible reflect modern science?

I was hoping to discuss some ideas about ancient cosmology at some stage. In the meantime Greg has raised the more fundamental issue of presuppositions and modern evangelicals. My initial response is below though some items may need clarification.

Greg: ...you seem to be concerned with the idea that the Bible has to reflect our current understanding of the world in order for it's inerrency and infallibility to be upheld.

Well actually my view of Scripture means that I reject a lot of current popular theory. While I accept the world is spherical, I reject Darwinism which is by far the most popular understanding in modern science concerning the origin and development of the biosphere.

Your bias is constrained to a specific view of inerrency. He may prefer another, but each one tips either of you in a particular direction and to a particular interpretation that satisfies the requirements of that inerrency.

I presume "he" in this sentence refers to Gier. I am aware of different views. See here for inerrancy and infallibility. I also have a pastor who is neither a inerrantist nor a creationist whom I sit under quite happily. While I think that some passages appear difficult with an inerrant approach, I think that their resolution leads to deeper understanding of the way of God. This has occurred enough for me that initially contradictory passages do not send me reeling each time I come across one. I tend to look deeper into the context and some inferences turn out to not exist. We can read more into a passage than is often there.

More importantly, I think Scripture points to an inerrantist approach. See my comments on Jesus' interaction with the Sadducees.

An aside, be careful how you use the term inerrancy, it has a meaning. If you propose another meaning preferably use a different word. Even the word "infallibility" seems to imply inerrancy however it has a theological definition that specifies inerrant doctrine which potentially allows for error of fact.

This concerns me because I see an initiative to interpret passages in a certain way that conforms it to modern science,

The idea that anyone before Bacon really understood science quite the way we do is questionable. I think you are better to talk about the worldviews of then and now. Even Gier uses the term pre-scientific which is better though can still be misleading. I am more concerned about having a biblical worldview than a Western one. While the current Western worldview gets much wrong, it is important to realise that the Western worldview developed from Christianity—likely with some added Greek philosophy (to its detriment I think). Because of this the Western worldview is very Christian unlike many other cultures including pre-Christian Europe and Briton.

You will need to give examples of specific passages.

when an interpretation that draws from the science of their day explains it much better.

Except is the interpretation drawing from their day? Much of what I see is a later construct of what the ancients supposedly thought based on a hyperliteralist interpretation of ancient literature.

I see this a lot in the church, and once again, if I am wrong about you, I apologize.

You may be correct about me, though I give my views considered thought.

A modern person who wishes to explain scripture in light of modern science has the burden of proof upon them first.

Why? If Scripture is consistent with modern science why insist on a different interpretation just to make it inconsistent?

They need to show how an ancient person could have known what we know,

This assumes an anti-supernatural bias. If God created the universe he is more knowledgeable about its intricacies than every scientist combined. God can reveal material that happens to be factually correct, even if simplified. I am not stating that this has to be the case, rather pointing out the bias which insists on human authorship sans divine authorship. Scripture suggests both human and divine. Peter adds that prophets did not always understand everything about their message (1 Peter 1). I am not suggesting that the message of the prophets was differential mathematics and quantum physics, just the importance of divine authorship.

what benefit it provided the ancients,

It may not offer a benefit, it may just be an accurate report.

why God would only make it truly relevant to moderns in the West,

Examples such as?

and why the church missed these interpretations all this time and had to wait until the 20th century before science could shed light on things.

The church didn't. My previous post on the flat earth mentioned that theologians in general did not teach a flat earth. Several appealed to Scripture to "prove" geocentricism. The fact they could only do so by appealing to poetical passages should have been a concern. Both hyperliteralism (including the Jews) and over-allegorising have been practised in interpretation, but that does not deny that Scripture can be understood. Moderns possibly do this less than some previous generations. Though there is a trend to turn historical narrative into symbolic language.

This comment also seems to contradict your earlier comment,

Going forward we as Christians must always be willing to follow where God's Word leads us and not be afraid to discard tradition if a new understanding can fit the picture better. Many doctrines, or the expression and depth of understanding concerning them, have developed, been lost and found again numerous times throughout our history. There is always the possibility old understandings will crumble in the face of new discoveries.

While I agree with discarding tradition, I am cautious about new interpretations. They may exist but one would want very good evidence.

On a slightly tangential but important note—and this does not apply to the shape of the earth—part of my concern is how little people understand the types of science. Operational and historical science are quite different and a reasonable argument can be made that the latter is not strictly science. Historical science is a claim about history. It is a claim that can be refuted by eyewitness testimony.

For example scientific examination of Jericho cannot "prove" Joshua did not raze it. Both are claims in the same realm: historical truth. One is just playing a contemporary witness off against a non-contemporary interpreter. Either the first is a liar or the latter is mistaken in his interpretation of his findings.

Presuppositions are important. I think there is good reason to hold to inerrancy based on how Jesus and the apostles viewed Scripture. I think the Bible is historical and that it is correct when it makes historical claims. I think it important to understand what the author intended and the cultural situation into which he spoke. I disagree (in general) with hyperliteralism, but I think the bigger problem in this age is the priority of secular theory and hence unwarranted claims of symbolism, the explosion of interpretations, the invention of hermeneutic principles, the cherry picking of Scripture, the holding of contradictory ideas and anything else that lets us hold on to our favourite ideas; be that psychological, biological, sociological, political or any other theory which we cherish.

A theory that explains everything explains nothing

I have been a little ticked at the number of times global warming is mentioned in connection with particular events when there is no association even reasoned. I guess, instead, I should be amused at the foolishness of men, except their political aspirations are too great and intentioned policies too invasive.

The associations of events with (non-existent) global warming remind me of the evolutionists just-so stories, people passing off their fantasies as fact. The concept that completely-fictional-stories-that-people-imagine-could-have-possibly-happened is even remotely representative of proper scientific investigation is ridiculous.

The claim that global warming is causing any current crisis is also ridiculous. The concern is future warming (albeit the near future). There has been no significant warming effect that one can currently blame CO₂ for, and it looks like there may have been some cooling over the last few years.

John Brignell has compiled a list of all the things attributed to global warming, from acne to yellow fever. His list includes contradictory examples such as more and less hurricanes, more and less coral growth, warming and cooling, more and less maple syrup. (Some of the links are not effects, rather actions that people have advocated to halt global warming).

Now a cause can have more than one effect and even opposite effects depending on the conditions, but when a cause is claimed to result in every possible event it cannot true—based on the Law of Non Contradiction. A theory that explains everything really explains nothing. It is not predictive and it is not falsifiable. If global warming is claimed to cause everything how can it possibly be disproved?

The only test of any analysis is its truth

I am currently reading America's Great Depression by Murray N. Rothbard. He makes an interesting comment concerning critiques of Austrian economic theory. If it was included in the first edition, this comment was made in 1963:

Hayek believes that Mises's theory is somehow deficient because it is exogenous—because it holds that the generation of business cycles stems from interventionary acts rather than from acts of the market itself. This argument is difficult to fathom. Processes are either analyzed correctly or incorrectly; the only test of any analysis is its truth, not whether it is exogenous or endogenous. If the process is really exogenous, then the analysis should reveal this fact; the same holds true for endogenous processes. No particular virtue attaches to a theory because it is one or the other.

I found this reminiscent of the intelligent design debate. My substitutions bolded.

Evolutionists believe that intelligent design theory is somehow deficient because it is non-naturalistic—because it holds that the generation of genetic information stems from interventionary acts rather than from acts of the organism itself. This argument is difficult to fathom. Processes are either analyzed correctly or incorrectly; the only test of any analysis is its truth, not whether it is naturalistic or non-naturalistic. If the process is really non-naturalistic, then the analysis should reveal this fact; the same holds true for naturalistic processes. No particular virtue attaches to a theory because it is one or the other.

Message and matter

It is important to understand the fundamental difference between these 2 concepts. Matter is all around us. Everything physical in the universe is matter or energy and Einstein showed us that they are essentially interchangeable, at least in essence if not always in practice. The stars, the earth, the moon. All the objects on the earth, both animate and inanimate. All are material. Composed of atoms and/ or photons.

As such they obey the laws of physics. Mass attracts, objects fall, momentum and energy are conserved, and entropy increases. They all obey the laws of chemistry which at a foundational level are laws of physics for elements. Why the chemistry laws should be as they are, ie. could the elements theoretically be different, is a different question.

None of this is too complex to understand, neither is it modern. While the ancients may not have understood the scientific laws in such detail, the concept of the material was well understood. And the material was often distinguished from the spiritual.

What I think it very important to comprehend is that information is utterly distinct from matter and not reliant on it. It exists independent of matter and there is no reason to think it could not exist even if matter itself did not. Though the existence of matter without information is unlikely to be possible.

Information or intelligence is difficult to quantify, though it can be done. Information is frequently stored in matter but it is in no way dependant on the matter in which it is stored. This post as you read it is stored magnetically on your hard-drive, having been copied from a server elsewhere. However it could be printed and stored in toner on paper. Or you could memorise it and it would be stored in your neurons. But the message is not derived nor is dependant on magnetism, paper, ink or anything else composed of matter.

This concept is fundamental. And it has significant implications.

1. It means that the 2 (message and matter) are to be distinguished from each other, something that may not be done in defending various theories.
2. They are not derived from each other. Information cannot make material and material cannot make information.
3. We need a source for both matter and information.
4. The laws that govern information are not those that govern matter. Information does not obey the law of gravity, it does not contain momentum, it cannot be transformed to energy.

Expanding on item 2: One might argue that a powerful source of information can create matter, but this is a being, not just an idea.

Information that appears to arise from matter is merely the level of information that already exists in the matter, it is not created by the matter. The limited information to describe a crystal structure is intrinsic to the information already contained within the physics and chemistry of the molecules.

Note that the crystal structure of salt is low information content and no more than can be known from our (potential) understanding of sodium, chloride, solutions and temperature. However deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) has information that is imposed on it which is not intrinsic to nucleic acids, sugar bases, or phosphate. One can transcribe the code onto a computer or paper and the code remains intact.

Random quote

You cannot find out what Napoleon did at the battle of Austerlitz by asking him to come and fight it again in a laboratory with the same combatants, the same terrain, the same weather, and in the same age. You have to go to the records. We have not, in fact, proved that science excludes miracles: we have only proved that the question of miracles, like innumerable other questions, excludes laboratory treatment.

C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock

Vanquishing Atheism's Vanguard

I reviewed Vox Day's book The Irrational Atheist for Tekton Apologetics Ministries and the review has recently been uploaded. The Tekton rating system is a 1–3 thumbs down for negative reviews and 1–3 thumbs up for positive reviews (with no neutral option). I gave the book 2+ (ie. a 4 on a 0–5 scale)

The review is at Tektonics and I have reproduced it below.

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Vanquishing Atheism's Vanguard

A Review of Vox Day's The Irrational Atheist

by Joel Bethyada

I had high expectations for this book. This concerned me somewhat as it increased the chances of being disappointed on reading it. Suffice it to say that it met my prior elevated expectations.

Vox is witty. He is both very clever and very funny. When you are laughing just reading the contents page you know it is going to be a good book.

What is useful in this foray into the New Atheist territory is that Vox lets them choose the battlefield and the weapons. And while Vox has no hesitancy in demolishing the arguments with his opponents' swords, he frequently just sharpens them before handing them back leaving the New Atheists to eviscerate themselves!

The first few chapters cover the ground rules. Subsequent chapters are devoted to various popular atheists exposing their foolishness or duplicity. Despite the subtitle (Dissecting the Unholy Trinity of Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens), Vox also has chapters on Dennett and Onfray. That they are not referred to in the title is due to Vox's admiration of the former's honesty, despite his mistaken conclusions; and the consistency of the latter's position, albeit a horrifying one.

He then discusses objections to Christianity that have been raised by several of New Atheism's statesmen or are commonly used by contemporary atheists. Vox suggests that Hitler was neither Christian nor atheist, but likely pagan; briefly dismissing the genetic fallacy that Hitler was raised Christian by noting that so were Dawkins and Hitchens. The Inquisition is dismissed mentioning themes that have previously been raised by other apologists, and also making the astute observation the the precipitating cause had a higher body count than all the inquisitors over several centuries combined. He then covers the Crusades. And finally human sacrifice in religion suggesting that often times political subjection was a primary motivation over piety. I am less certain the ancients made as great a distinction from the spiritual as modern day secularism.

Following along the lines of the Christians-behaving-badly arguments, the tables are turned and the New Atheists are forced to answer for unprecedented mass murder of the more powerful atheists (and only atheists!) of the 20th century.

As a theological addendum, Vox takes on theodicy and determinism using analogy with computer games. The analogy is quite a useful one but because of some theological errors, minor equivocation and pushing the analogy further than it is capable of, this section, while interesting reading, is less compelling than the atheist trouncing.

The style is slightly difficult at times (but made up for in the humour); the arguments are reasonable to follow but some sentences take slow focused concentration or re-reading. Vox makes frequent reference to his vast knowledge of topics and persons and reading the electronic version may be preferable to allow quick searches on esoteric comments. (The electronic version is available free online).

The book's strengths include a offence approach—though perhaps a little aggressive, if one is going to take someone to task about minor mathematical errors he best be sure to make none himself—and arguing within the atheist paradigm. Weaknesses include allowing his opponents to label scientific that which is certainly not empirical evidence and better labelled historical, and the discussion of complexity where Vox fails to identify the real flaw in Dawkins' argument and his fractal designer rebuttal is incorrect.

Will this book affect persons on either side of the debate? I hope so. Certainly the more noble of the atheist crowd will ponder its conclusions and it may perhaps draw them away from the dogmatic assertion that "God is not." It will certainly encourage Christians who have thought the New Atheist arguments held water to realise they are hot air—if they can overlook any theological disagreements they have with the author. And for those who were already convinced of the New Atheist stupidity it certainly adds more ammunition to their armoury.