Wednesday, 11 November 2009

Dumb inventions

Life magazine ran an article on some of the dumbest inventions in the 20th century.

I found the caption to this one amusing.



Honegar, 1959

Inventor of a honey and vinegar mixture, called Honegar, Dr. DeForest C. Jarvis. Honegar was said to be a folk remedy for aches and pains, though it mainly sounds like a cure for lack of nausea.

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Wednesday, 4 November 2009

Right to internet access?

Finland is looking to make fast internet access a legal requirement and is couching the law in terms of "rights". From Laura Vilkkonen, the legislative counselor for the Ministry of Transport and Communications,

We think it's something you cannot live without in modern society. Like banking services or water or electricity, you need Internet connection,... Universal service is every citizen's subjective right.
There are so many things wrong here.

What does she mean by a "subjective right"? Since when are banking and electricity rights? And how something that has barely existed in the course of history can philosophically be considered a right is preposterous.

Making high speed internet access a right mocks the concept of rights.

And it significantly impinges on the freedom or internet service providers in doing business.

Who is going to pay? If it is the consumer surely he should be free to choose a slower speed/ cheaper option, especially if the higher speed/ dearer option precludes any internet connection (though now a "right" the state will come to the party).

Coming soon to a government near you,
It is a view shared by the United Nations, which is making a big push to deem Internet access a human right.

In June, France's highest court declared such access a human right. But Finland goes a step further by legally mandating speed.
That France legislates such measures is suggestive that such rights do not exist. The fact that the United Nations supports it is confirmation they do not.

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Tuesday, 3 November 2009

Random quote

My parents told me there aren't any ghosts. They told me there aren't any goblins. They only told me those things once, though. They tell me there isn't a God every week. There must be a God.

Irina Ratushinskaya, age 9.

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Sunday, 25 October 2009

Moral perspectives on lying

There are a range of Christian theories on the moral acceptability of lying.

The issues around lying seem difficult to fully categorise in English. The problem is a lack of simple words to express subtle differences in meaning. To illustrate this note that the concept of lying can be considered analogous to killing. With killing we have sub-terms such as murder, manslaughter, and capital punishment. We also recognise killing in a variety of situations such as warfare and self-defence. The debate about the morality of types of killing is more transparent because we agree on meaning, even if we disagree or the moral acceptability of them.


Whereas "lying" merely means distorting the truth irrespective of the circumstances. There are terms such as deception, falsification, untruthfulness, but these are basically synonymous. There are situational terms though, such as perjury.

So is falsehood a single conceptual category? I have long thought it meaningful that the 9th commandment is not, "You shall not lie," but rather, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour." I have previously distinguished between reality and what one perceives as reality stating that affirming a false belief is not lying. I have also made the distinction between voluntary and forced disclosure of information which I wish to expand on here.

The moral debate is that either:
  • lying (or specific types or lying) is objectively wrong, that is, various forms of absolutism; or
  • lying is not intrinsically wrong (for all people), (though it may be preferable to avoid in certain situations for other reasons), that is, forms of subjectivism.
Christianity claims that morality has its source in the moral law giver, thus it views the morality of truth telling as objective: the same rules for all people at all times. Here are particular forms of such absolutism.

1. Unqualified Absolutism

Lying is always wrong. People should never lie ever. No matter what the situation or consequences.

Doug Beaumont explains such unqualified absolutism.
Unqualified Absolutism is based on the idea that most moral actions are intrinsically right or wrong, and because sin is always avoidable there can be no actual moral conflict. Given a choice between telling the truth or lying to avoid a murder, for example, one must choose telling the truth for in that instance it is not the one speaking, but the murderer who is sinning. In that case it is better to permit sin than to commit it. This view states that moral "oughts" are viable regardless of their consequences, for any moral philosophy that has exceptions results in relativism. Moral law is based on God's unchanging nature, therefore moral law itself is unchanging. Logically, if an act is intrinsically evil, it cannot become good because of a changing situation. Finally, God can always provide a third alternative to sinful actions.
This is how many people view lying. It is a somewhat reasonable but it lacks depth. Exceptions to rules don't intrinsically mean relativism. True, exceptions can be special pleading or hypocrisy, but they may be legitimate (eg. age based rules). And as I note below, unqualified absolutism may conflate intrinsically different actions.

2. Conflicting absolutism

Lying is wrong, but it needs to be considered within the situation. If lying conflicts with another moral commandment then one must do obey the higher moral. But lying, while required, is still sinful.

Such a position acknowledges that we have moral conflict (at least in this age). I think this is an improvement as it notes that as bad as lying may be, it may not be the greatest evil (though lying is a bigger evil than many acknowledge). This position encourages people to do good and love their neighbour.

It fails in that it suggests at times all options a man may have involve sin. However if we wish to do right, Scripture suggests we are able to do so (thru God). Further, how much less are we to blame when others have placed us in a dilemma, rather than our own prior choices.

3. Graded absolutism

Lying is wrong unless it conflicts with a higher moral commandment. Obeying the higher moral by lying is not wrong or sinful.

This resolves the dilemma or not being able to make a right choice. It affirms moral conflict, but it claims that the choice to do the better is good. And not sinful if a greater good is being done. There may be some support from Jesus' words to the Pharisees. It discussing tithing garden herbs Jesus states
But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God. These you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.
While one could claim that tithing herbs and doing justice are morally equal—Jesus does say not to neglect the former—the context would suggest that doing justice is a higher moral command. Apologists for unqualified absolutism could argue Jesus commands they do both, but there is no conflict between moral obligations set up here, so unqualified absolutism cannot be proven from the passage. I am merely illustrating that moral commands are graded.

It is important to note that this is not arguing that the end justifies the means. Yes, the end is considered, but for the sake of doing good, not for preferred result. Doing good may have unpleasant consequences.

4. Libertarian absolutism

Lying is wrong if one is voluntarily giving information. One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information. I am responsible for my actions, not yours.

This has the advantage over graded absolutism in that it recognises that voluntary information and compelled information are categorically different. It is somewhat analogous to saying that predatory killing is sinful but self-defensive killing is not.

Interestingly Jesus' words may shed some light on our understanding here.
After this Jesus went about in Galilee. He would not go about in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him. Now the Jews’ Feast of Booths was at hand. So his brothers said to him, "Leave here and go to Judea, that your disciples also may see the works you are doing. For no one works in secret if he seeks to be known openly. If you do these things, show yourself to the world." For not even his brothers believed in him. Jesus said to them, "My time has not yet come, but your time is always here. The world cannot hate you, but it hates me because I testify about it that its works are evil. You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, for my time has not yet fully come." After saying this, he remained in Galilee.

But after his brothers had gone up to the feast, then he also went up, not publicly but in private. The Jews were looking for him at the feast, and saying, "Where is he?" And there was much muttering about him among the people. While some said, "He is a good man," others said, "No, he is leading the people astray." Yet for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him.

About the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and began teaching. (John 7, emphasis added)
Jesus said he wasn't going but then he did. This implies that Jesus' answer was not true. In fact some manuscripts say, "I am not yet going up to this feast." Which would seem to make Jesus' answer more honest. Looking at the passage it is clear Jesus wished to go without others initially knowing he was there. He is asked if he is going, however Jesus does not wish to tell this person. Being evasive may be construed as a yes. Jesus says that he is not going to this feast. Within the libertarian absolutism view a request is made of Jesus to divulge information he does not wish to give and he is at liberty to answer in a way that does not divulge same information.

This position is distinct from graded absolutism in that one is not weighing up morality in conflict. The distinction is in will for informing.

Although one could think nothing one hears in conversation is reliable, the solution is listen to what people wish to tell you.

5. Authoritative absolutism

Non aggressive version
  • Lying is wrong in non-aggressive situations. Self-defence against an aggressor allows for lying. Authorities are owed the truth.
Libertarian version
  • One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information unless being compelled by a legitimate authority.
Authoritative absolutism states the voluntary information must be true as per libertarian absolutism, or that all information must be true unless facing an aggressor. It states that, in general, compelled information does not need to be true though there can be variation on what is meant by compulsion.

But this position does allow an appropriate authority to force information (whereas strict libertarian absolutism would not). A person following libertarian absolutism would allow one to lie in court if he did not wish to divulge the truth. Non-aggressive absolutism would mean that it is eumoral (morally good) to tell the truth in legitimate courts and immoral to withhold it. Note the caveat: obeying a lesser authority is not required if that means disobeying a higher one. Obeying a policeman, a ruler, or a court is necessary even unjust ones, or in unpleasant circumstances; unless doing so compromises a higher earthly ruler or God.

Conclusion

People may argue for the legitimacy of any of these options within Christian theology. Unless one recognises that the concept of lying may include more than one category, graded absolutism is as far as one can advance and this seems to be the best approach. However the knowledge of a permissible sub-categorisation based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing allows for more nuanced views.

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Friday, 16 October 2009

Let it rain

The Newsboys sing a song called Let It Rain. It is about the apostle Peter before he dies. I think the frequent mention and allusion to water in the song is very clever.

Let It Rain

Fisher of men remembers...

And I have watched in wonder
As with a word You calmed a raging sea
I have seen You make the wine from water
Mud and water made a blind man see
Water still reminds me
Of the seaside where our eyes first met

Chorus
Let it rain
Lord we're waiting for Your rain to fall
Let it rain
Bringing back the wonder of it all
And I can see Your face again
When You let it rain

And I've been bathed in mercy
By every gesture, every word You've said
Once I spoke of power and high position
You took a towel and washed my feed instead
Water, like a promise
Heaven opens, but I'm not there yet

Chorus

I've been foolish
Thought I know it all
Three times I denied Your name
Your forgiveness, like a waterfall
Washes away my shame

A new dawn is breaking
Another hour, and then I leave this place
I am ready Lord to give my life for you
I'm so ready Lord to see Your face
Water like a promise
And in this final hour I think my final prayer shall be
Would You let it rain?
Let Your Spirit fall afresh on me

Chorus

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Saturday, 10 October 2009

Adjusting multiple choice examinations

Multiple choice examinations have several benefits. They have no intra- or intermarker variability. In fact they can be automated. And I wouldn't be surprised if they are as effective as any other system in effectively evaluating material.

They need to be well written.

  • The correct answer needs to be clearly more correct than other options.
  • The correct answer should not be able to be guessed by the construction of the question.
  • The order of the answer option should be random.
  • A reasonable number of options need to be given.
    • And the same number of options for every question.
  • A significant number of questions needs to be included.
    • The problem with multiple choice questions is the chance element. This can be reduced by increasing the number of questions.
If we have 20 questions with 4 options for each question, then random guessing will lead to people getting 5 correct on average (Exam mark = 25%); 20 / 4. However the range of correct answers will be quite great. Some will get 1 correct (5%), others 10 (50%). Whereas 200 questions will mean that people get 50 correct on average (Exam mark still = 25%), but a much lower range. Some may get 40 correct (20%), others 60 correct (30%).

Thus both exams when taken by people ignorant of the topic will give an average mark of 25%, but the chance of any particular individual getting a high mark is much greater with a smaller number of questions.

This seems obvious based on the examples above. Mathematically the range of marks is (inversely) related to the number of questions. The standard deviation of the range of answer marks is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of questions.

The other issue is standardising the results. Because people are likely to get 25% of the answers correct by chance (for 4 options), then one could subtract 25% from the final mark. So if you get 25% as a raw mark, you likely didn't know the answer to any of the questions, that is your knowledge is 0%. So we subtract 25% from your mark to get your adjusted mark, which is 0%.

However if you get 100%, it is unlikely you knew 75% and got the other 25% correct by chance. Rather you get the ones you know correct, and you tend to get about a quarter of the ones you don't know correct. So if you know 50% of the questions you will get 50% plus a quarter of the remaining 50%, that is 12.5%, which gives you a total of 50% + 12.5% = 62.5%. So a raw mark of 62.5% needs to be scaled back to 50%. And 100% means you know all the answers and does not need to be scaled back at all.

So we need to adjust the raw marks linearly to get adjusted marks.
  • Let N be the number of questions.
  • Let R be the number of options.
  • Let X be the number of questions correct.
  • Let Y be the adjusted number of questions correct.
Then
  • X/N is the raw mark.
  • Y/N is the adjusted mark.
  • N/R is the chance number of correct answers.
When X = N/R then the mark needs to be adjusted to zero, ie. Y = 0.
When X = N then the mark needs no adjustment, ie. Y = N and Y/N = 1 (= 100%).

The number of questions correct equals the number of questions known plus the remaining number of questions divided by the number of options.

X = Y + (NY)/R

Rearranging for Y we get

Y = (RXN)/(R – 1)

Or as a mark

Y/N = 100% × (RXN)/N(R – 1)

And any negative numbers are given zero.

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Thursday, 8 October 2009

Bursting bubbles...

...literally. Presumably this was taken on a high speed camera. Very clever.


From Flickr. There are several other similar photos.

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Monday, 5 October 2009

Random quote

The budget should be balanced, the Treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled, and the assistance to foreign lands should be curtailed lest Rome becomes bankrupt. People must again learn to work, instead of living on public assistance.

Cicero, 106-43 BC

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Thursday, 1 October 2009

Internet interlude

I will be away from the internet for a fortnight. I have some posts scheduled to come up, but I am unlikely to respond to comments.

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Monday, 28 September 2009

The illegitimacy of anti-supernatural causation

My recent post led to some discussion, mainly in response to my opposition in defining science as methodological naturalism. I think the previous use of the term Natural Philosophy was adequate for the time. It made it clear that it was the study of natural phenomena without the baggage of additional metaphysics that are unnecessary to the practice of science. The subsequent addition of historical science to operational science to encompass all "science" makes short descriptions more difficult.

My contention is that forcing singular past events to be natural (that is not supernatural) is artificial (not genuine) and arbitrary (not determined by necessity); in that if God did make an object, methodological naturalism would prefer the false explanation that man made it over the true explanation that God did. david w states

The difference is artificial if there can be evidence for supernatural causation. How... [can] we know if God made a house?
This is putting the cart before the horse. One cannot argue philosophically that God does not exist thus he cannot make anything thus nothing is made by God. One can argue philosophically the case for and against God, but if there is empirical evidence otherwise, that must be taken into consideration.

To ask what such evidence is for God, but deny that evidence is even possible within one's philosophy is disingenuous.

If God exists and he made man, and is at least as capable as man then he can make anything man can make. It does not matter whether or not we can identify a particular object is made by God, the fact is this is theoretically possible. And a definition that excludes God from producing something when it possible that he could, and thus God didn't, even if he did, is fallacious.

I think there is reason to think that God made some objects. But definitive evidence, or even any evidence, that God made something is not necessary to allow that possibility. We allow for that possibility in other situations, such as an unknown culture, or the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence.

It must be recognised that we are looking at effects, thus inferring the source. Extensive knowledge, or any knowledge, about the source is not required beforehand. It is in studying the effect that we theorise about the source.

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Monday, 21 September 2009

Bypassing the argument thru definition

Choosing one's terms and labels may be an effective rhetorical technique; albeit frequently a dishonest one. Here are few examples that I find irritating.

Pro abortion as pro-choice

I have concerns with terms used on both sides of this debate, but this the more insidious. It is describing the issue in terms of freedom, but opponents to abortion are by no means anti-freedom. They see the issue as one of murder. I don't hear "pro-choice" people advocating for the freedom of men to murder adults, or steal property. The pro-freedom position is reasonably described as libertarian. It is true many libertarians are "pro-choice" but this is not universal with some libertarians arguing against abortion. More relevant however is the position "pro-choice" people take otherwise, and this is commonly a socialist leaning position, hardly a paragon of choice or freedom. I would not be surprised to learn that opponents of abortion have a stronger commitment to choice outside the abortion debate.

I don't particularly like the term "pro-life" either. The debate is about whether a fetus is living in a sense that confers the fetus natural rights. Although I hold this position, many abortion advocates disagree with it. As such they could argue they are pro-life and consistent by opposing capital punishment. I think it preferable to use accurate unloaded terms such as "pro-abortion" and "anti-abortion."

Science as methodological naturalism

Science does not need to be defined this way and historically it was not. While it may seem somewhat reasonable on the surface, it fails on 2 counts. The meaning and reason for the term "methodological naturalism" is that one can not invoke the supernatural as an explanation, rather science seeks natural explanations for various phenomena. Given that operational science was invented by supernaturalists whose concept of God (immutable) gave them reason to think the world was orderly and thus amenable to repeated observation with an expectation of identical findings, it is uncertain why a definition using "naturalism" needs to be invoked centuries later.

It fails because it does not apply to historical science which has no such non-supernatural limitations yet historical science is considered part of the broader concept of science. And it fails because it contains a philosophical term: Naturalism has a range of claims which are not derived from science, nor does science intrinsically favour naturalism.

Such a term can lead to the claim that science has disproved God. But analysis of this claim will show it to be circular. God is excluded by definition, and any thesis sans God is deemed "scientifically" preferable, even if untrue.

Gender neutral as gender accurate translation

There is debate about how to best translate various Greek words into English in Bible translation. Does one translate masculine pronouns such as "he" inclusively or specifically? Does the Greek word anthropos mean "person" or "man" with generic connotations at times? I do not intend to discuss the merits of both arguments, just note that the inclusive school uses the term "gender accurate" to describe their theory. They argue that an inclusive view is intended by biblical authors, thus improved accuracy. One problem is that the term "accurate" is more synonymous with "precision" than "intention". The other problem, of course, is that the debate is around which translation theory is the most accurate. Using a term as part of your definition, then claiming something is thus, by definition—often implicitly—resolves nothing.

Suggestion

The reason this annoys me is that the terms are deliberately chosen. Their inventors are not so much trying to frame the debate as circumvent it. I find it disingenuous.

This is not to suggest choosing various terms is intrinsically dishonest. If a different term brings clarity, or is neutral, or both, then it may be preferable.

Sometimes one should consider terms used by his opponents. While the adoption of labels from the opposition is not compulsory, they may sometimes be accurate. Another option is to use historical terms.

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Tuesday, 15 September 2009

The ropens of Papua New Guinea

Mike T brings my attention to the incompletely documented creatures called ropens. Several eye-witness accounts describe featherless flying creatures that perch upright on trees on the islands of Papua New Guinea.

Around Manus Island, the wingspan is three to four feet, according to Jim Blume, a missionary in Wau, on the mainland. Blume’s investigations indicate that wingspans may reach ten to fifteen feet in other areas. Whitcomb’s book mentions a few ropens that are even larger, including the ones seen by Hodgkinson and the Australian couple.
I am familiar with a variety of sightings of reptiles that are otherwise thought to be extinct, such as the bunjip. But I had not heard about ropens.

The description seems to be of a pterosaur. What I found particularly interesting about these sightings was the mention of lights on the animals.
Two natives described a ropen holding itself upright on a tree trunk (fruit bats hang upside down from branches), and his book also describes an apparently bioluminescent glow that may help the nocturnal creatures catch fish.
I am not aware that palaeontologists propose bioluminescence in pterosaurs. However previous eye-witnesses have suggested something similar. In his book After the Flood, Bill Cooper quotes Marie Trevelyan's book Folk-Lore and Folk Stories of Wales, published in 1909.
The woods around Penllin Castle, Glamorgan, had the reputation of being frequented by winged serpents, and these were the terror of old and young alike. An aged inhabitant of Penllyne, who died a few years ago, said that in his boyhood the winged serpents were described as very beautiful. They were coiled when in repose, and "looked as if they were covered with jewels of all sorts. Some of them had crests sparkling with all the colours of the rainbow". When disturbed they glided swiftly, "sparkling all over," to their hiding places. When angry, they "flew over people's heads, with outspread wings, bright, and sometimes with eyes too, like the feathers in a peacock's tail". He said it was "no old story invented to frighten children", but a real fact. His father and uncle had killed some of them, for they were as bad as foxes for poultry. The old man attributed the extinction of the winged serpents to the fact that they were "terrors in the farmyards and coverts" (emphasis mine).
The Welsh description may be iridescence rather than luminescence, but I think the parallel striking. While I know too little about the Papua New Guinea story to vouch for its veracity, the lack of communication between Welsh and New Guinean witnesses concerning a pterosaur trait not otherwise recognised does give one pause.

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Sunday, 13 September 2009

A definition of information

Message theory has been variously defined in terms of how we recognise design, what information means, and how information can be measured.

German engineer Werner Gitt identifies 5 levels of information.

  1. Statistics
  2. Syntax
  3. Semantics
  4. Pragmatics
  5. Apobetics
I understand the choice of the term "statistics" though I think a preferable term would be something like "storage," or perhaps "transmission quantity" (as storage media may be redundant).

The level of statistics is concerned with the possible options for each symbol and the number of symbols contained in the text block of interest. The number of symbols for binary are 2: 0,1. For English we have 27: letters and word space (punctuation and numbers excluded). For DNA we have 4: A, T, G, C.

Shannon's theory of information does analysis at this level. This level is completely devoid of any meaning, and Shannon may give higher values to messages with zero actual meaning, such as random numbers, than to meaningful statements.

Syntax is the choice of code. A deliberate, though arbitrary, convention of what groups of symbols mean. In English "cat" has meaning, but "ith" does not. And "come" has meaning in English and Italian, but not the same meaning. DNA at the gene level has the convention of codons; groups of 3 nucleotides such as CAC which codes for valine.

Semantics are at the level of communicating ideas. The code itself does not communicate ideas. We need words but we talk in sentences. It is at this level we have meaning. Further, it is at this level meaning is invariant. We could communicate the same idea in a different language which would use a different code (syntax) and result in different storage requirements (statistics).

It is at this level (at least) that information (meaning) needs to be considered when discussing gain and loss of information.

Gitt gives a useful illustration of semantics.
A: The bird singed the song.
B: The green freedom prosecuted the cerebrating house.

Sentence B is perfectly correct syntactically, but is semantically meaningless. In contrast, the semantics of sentence A is acceptable, but its syntax is erroneous.
Pragmatics is about action based on the ideas. And apobetics is about the purpose for the action.

Is important to note that much work has been done at the level of statistics. This is probably largely a result of the computer revolution; though possibly partly because this is the easiest level to define and analyse. But statistics does not discriminate meaning from non-meaning.

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Saturday, 12 September 2009

Early coding efforts

I found this comment amusing. Pirate Bay creators are working on an embedded video site named Video Bay. The coding level is claimed to be extreme beta, with the warning

Don't expect anything to work at all

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Wednesday, 9 September 2009

An analogy between information and energy

Information technology is a useful term. We store information and transfer it, all of which is helpful in understanding the information is not matter. However the association with storage capacity means that people may think in terms of size—number of bits—not the nature of what is stored.

This is somewhat analogous to talking about fuel tank capacity. Vehicles need energy to travel and all things being equal a larger fuel tank will supply more energy. But the issue here is energy. If one focuses on fuel tank size he can forget that it matters what is in the fuel tank. Different grades of gasoline contain different amounts of energy, and the same is true for other fuels such as methanol, ethanol, and coal. One can even fill a tank with substances that contain no energy such as sand or water (fusion disregarded). And other forms of energy such as electricity do not even require a petrol tank.

So while fuel tank size can be a proxy for energy, it may be inadequate, or even inappropriate. One must remember that it is energy that is being discussed.

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