The Word became flesh and dwelt among us

God gives Habakkuk a vision, he says

“Write the vision;
make it plain on tablets,
so he may run who reads it.” (Hab 2:2 ESV)

The last line being difficult to translate: make the vision plain on the tablets:

• so that it might be read quickly. (LEB)
• so he may run who reads it. (ESV)
• so that a herald may run with it. (NIV)
• so the one who announces it may read it easily. (NET)
• That the one who reads it may run. (NASB)

more literally

• so that one who reads in it may run; or
• it might run reading/proclaiming upon it; or
• so the one who reads/proclaims it might run; or 
• so that he running, he reading/proclaiming, from this [tablet]

The NET gives the meaning that it is easy to read such that one can run his eyes through the text. Another interpretation is that it is easy enough to read so that someone can read from the tablet even while he is running. One could paraphrase the last line: so that he can read it while he is running. I side with a person running interpretation which is the meaning given in the ESV and NASB. The ancients usually read out loud so the idea is probably that of one proclaiming, that is a herald as per the NIV.

But note 3 aspects:

“Write the vision;
make it plain on tablets,
so that he who proclaims it may run.”

This describes a message: the vision; a medium: tablets; and a messenger: the person proclaiming. All information has this: content, a carrier medium, and communication (speaking, reading, etc).

Compare John's introduction to his gospel.

And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. (Joh 1:14)

We have a message: the Word; a medium: flesh (the incarnation); and a messenger: him dwelling with us. Yet Jesus is all these 3 things. Jesus is the message; Jesus is what the message is written on, that is, the incarnation; and Jesus is the messenger.

Jesus stood up and cried out, “If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink.” (Joh 7:37).

The laws of nature

This article puts together several ideas that I have been pondering over the years but have not written much about or with such clarity. Doyle covers important issues such as:

• The limited relationship between physical laws and judicial law
• The moral nature of judicial law
• The descriptive but non-prescriptive nature of physical law
• How physical law represents God's general upholding of the universe
• How miracles represent God's special activity in the universe
• That miracles are impossible is a specious argument
• That the term "methodological naturalism" is polemical, and unhelpful

Concerning methodological naturalism and science, Doyle not only notes that the term "methodological naturalism" invokes philosophical naturalism ("naturalism" being the shortened form) because they sound similar, methodological naturalism is not even accurate because naturalism does not imply regularity—why should we expect an ordered universe? I think a more useful term for science is empirical induction. Such a term would make scientific fields much narrower though increase clarity. Much of cosmology, palaeontology, archaeology and many other disciplines would come under the umbrella of inferred history.

I would like to add a thought on law. It is not clear than the physical laws are informational rather than just geometrical. The descriptions of such laws are informational, but the laws themselves may not be. I think that they are but that they have low information content. High information content occurs in designed objects such as flowers and people. And morality, while containing information, is more than information. That is, we have matter (and related qualities such as space and time) and the physical laws that describe how they behave; we have message which represents complex objects; and we have morals which specify how conscious objects are to behave.

An excellent article that I wish I had written.

Defining arguments away—the distorted language of secularism

by Shaun Doyle

Abstract

One of the means that secularists have used to achieve dominance in the culture over the last 250 years has been the manipulation of language. Key terms have been modified, and new terms coined, which slant the ‘rules of engagement’ between Christianity and secularism against Christianity. Three terms in particular: ‘natural law’, ‘miracle’, and ‘methodological naturalism’ have been affected. If we do not expose and correct this sophistry, an honest debate is not possible. At root, these issues reflect the clash between worldviews that must ultimately be accepted for reasons outside of science.

‘The laws of nature’—confusion and caution

One of the most common ways to talk about well-established scientific ideas is to refer to them as ‘the laws of nature’, ‘natural law/s’, or ‘scientific law/s’. These phrases conjure up notions of an orderly universe, and convey the idea that science can teach us much about the universe. The notion of ‘law’ can be a helpful metaphor for understanding the regularity we see in how the universe works, but it is just a metaphor.

One thing true of all metaphors is that they are only helpful to a point before they break down. They do so because, from the point of view of formal logic, all metaphors break the law of non-contradiction. When they are pushed too far, different things end up equated in ways that amount to false statements. For example, saying “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s gentleness equates the physical softness of the teddy bear with the gentle character of Mark, which amounts to saying that Mark has a gentle character. However, saying that “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s physical makeup does not work because Mark, a human, is clearly not made of stuffing! Not all the attributes of teddy bears can be attributed to Mark, and vice versa. This doesn’t invalidate the use of metaphors because everyone intuitively knows this, and we don’t use a metaphor to say that two different things are logically identical—only that they are identical in some significant and relevant property in a particular sense.

‘Natural law’ is itself a metaphor for the regularities of the physical world drawn from the concept of human law. Moreover, it’s a natural metaphor to draw, given a sovereign moral Lawgiver who also upholds His creation in an orderly way (figure 1). The regularities of nature are so regular that they seem to reflect some principle that the matter itself cannot transgress, like how people cannot transgress a human law. However, the notions of obedience and transgression are themselves concepts that most properly apply to the behaviour of moral agents—a concept which does not apply to inanimate matter and energy. That is one of many ways that human laws are not identical to ‘natural laws’, and presents an area where the metaphor breaks down.

Are ‘natural laws’ prescriptive?

However, as people jettisoned the Bible and its doctrine of providence and came to accept a ‘fuzzy positivism’ in its place from the 19^th century onwards, many people seemed to forget that the notion of ‘natural law’ is just a metaphor. Because of this, and that the metaphor is so fitting, we have forgotten to pay attention to those areas where the regularities of nature do not correspond to human laws. Failure to recognize the metaphorical nature of ‘natural law’ has brought undue confusion over how the world actually works. The problem is that people often conceive of ‘the laws of nature’ as materially equivalent to human laws. If someone does what human law forbids, it is described as ‘breaking’ or ‘violating’ the law. People then apply this same notion of law to ‘the laws of nature’, and consider a miracle in the same way they consider an illegal act—as if some precept has been ‘broken’ or ‘violated’. The biggest mistake people make when they equate ‘natural law’ and human law is that they make natural law prescriptive. However, there are two major errors with understanding the concept of ‘natural law’ like this.

First, when people think of ‘natural laws’ as prescriptive, there is in fact a subtle but significant difference in what ‘prescriptive’ connotes in comparison to human laws. Human laws are prescriptive messages—they are coded information. Human laws are not inextricably bound to any given physical form—one can communicate the law “you shall not murder” in any human language, and in numerous different physical formats (e.g. writing on a piece of paper, Morse code, speech, etc.). Moreover, a human law cannot render the act of murder physically impossible. Herein lies the difference—when ‘natural law’ is seen as prescriptive, it is not conceived of as merely coded information, but is something materially able to make certain states of affairs physically impossible. However, ascribing ‘natural law’ a tangible existence like this commits the fallacy of reification, which treats abstract concepts as concrete objects. ‘Natural law’ is an abstract concept—it is coded information, like human laws, which formally describes regular patterns observed in nature. As such, ‘natural laws’ have no more power to cause the regularities of nature than a redraw of a map of New Zealand can change the physical coastline.

Second, although human laws and ‘natural laws’ are both coded information, they are different types of messages. Human laws prescribe what people should and should not do, e.g. the law forbidding murder. The law itself says nothing about how people actually act—it is a command, not a statement of fact. ‘The laws of nature’ are different: they are formal descriptions of regular patterns observed in nature—i.e. they are statements of fact. They either correspond with reality or they do not. However, it is meaningless to apply the notion of correspondence with reality to a human law such as forbidding murder, because it is an imperative command, not a statement of fact. Conversely, the statement: “murder is ethically wrong” is a statement of (ethical) fact, and is generally implied to form the basis for the law forbidding murder. This means ‘the laws of nature’ are not formally prescriptive, and are more accurately seen as descriptive concepts.

Read the rest here

The invisible hand and central planning

I have not read Adam Smith and it may be that his metaphor has been extended beyond the original intention; yet the invisible hand is frequently used in the context of free trade, with the suggestion that government leave alone.

By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.

Freedom of trade in general leads to greater economic prosperity than that of a centralised economy: the invisible hand guides better than the economic planner.

I agree with this is general. It seems, however, that the metaphor implies that a less informative process is more productive than a more informative one; that a planner is less productive than no planner.

The thing is that there is planning, it is just that it is extended to all the buyers and sellers in a marketplace. All those minds making decisions about their economic options contain a vast wealth of information; more information than any group of planners could have. It is not an invisible hand that guides, it is an invisible collective knowledge that decides.

Intellectual property is information

Property as property proper is matter. It is material. It has height, width, depth and weight (mass). One could extend this to other attributes of matter such as current, time and temperature. Thus energy could be considered property which can be bought and sold. Though something being matter does not mean it necessarily can be bought and sold, many things have no ownership, or shared ownership.

Property as matter is fixed in time and space. It can shift in time and space, but it occupies space such that its presence in one place precludes its presence elsewhere. (Exceptions are when something is considered as a whole but can be split up, like air and water).

Ownership of an item means that it is your possession or under your oversight. You get to determine how it is used (within the confines of legality).

The limitation of locality and the fact of ownership means that a person can take an item, or place a claim to an item that is not his. Such behaviour is considered theft. It would include taking a computer from work, tomatoes out of your neighbour's garden, or shifting a boundary marker.

Contrast this to what is referred to as intellectual property. I have suggested we use an alternative term to prevent equivocation on the word property; such as "concept", "conceptualisation", "idea", "abstraction", or perhaps a Greek or Latin derived neologism. I will use concept in this post.

Concepts are information. Information does not have qualities of matter. It does not consist of length (in the usual sense), mass, time, current, or temperature. Thus it is non-material. It is still a real entity, just not a material one.

Therefore concepts are not restricted by the laws of physics. Concepts can be duplicated. Concepts can be lost or destroyed. Greek fire is a concept that has been lost. There is no conservation of matter or energy law that corresponds to concepts.

This means that concepts cannot be stolen in the way that property can be stolen. If you give someone else your concept you still have it. Because you still have your concept you cannot say that it has been removed from you. You can still use your concept. The difference is that now someone else has access to the concept and can use it as well.

I used the example of an axe. If someone steals your axe then they have it and you cannot use it. But if someone sees your axe and makes his own then he has not stolen your axe, you still have it. He now also has an axe because he has used your concept: the idea of attaching a splitting wedge to a stick.

Concepts can be mildly to very complicated. Complexity does not correspond directly to usefulness. And less complex concepts are not always obvious before the fact. A less complex solution to a problem may replace a more complex solution because of simplicity and cost.

The distinction between property as matter and concepts as information is foundational. One that must be apprehended before discussion about what copyright might entail. A rule of thumb in distinguishing between property and concepts: If you give something away and no longer have it, it is material; if you give it away and still have it, then it is information. As George Bernard Shaw said,

If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas.

SOPA and intellectual property as property

The (American) National Review comments on the problems with policing the internet in relation to piracy. They rightly note the error of forcing internet companies to do their police work for them and (possibly) punishing them for failing to do so. (I do not know the wording of the act. We now have a similar act in New Zealand.)

We are in general skeptical of government efforts to foist off difficult tasks onto businesses and other private parties, who already are expected to act as tax collectors (especially of sales taxes), immigration inspectors, and more.

They are also sceptical of the determination of the authorities to deal with this problem given that they are not acting on similar abuses that are already illegal

Judging by the fact that pirated DVDs are openly for sale in practically every city of any consequence in these United States, we have our doubts about the police authorities’ seriousness in these matters.

Further they doubt it will be effective

the worst offenders would of course have no incentive to do so, their guilt being plain and undeniable. Instead, the full-time pirates would have a very strong incentive to simply switch to another website, or to a proliferation of websites, or to deploy any number of commonly available technological solutions to defeat government attempts to block them.

I concur with their concerns here. I also find the modern practice of punishing the innocent to decrease the possibility of crime less than satisfactory. Frequently such laws do little to address the law-breakers yet are onerous on the law-abiding. Moderns combine this with an unwillingness to give adequate punishment for crime. Straitjacket all men to prevent crime but minimise the guilt of those who still pursue it.

The problem with the article is that they diminish the real issue which is associating property with intellectual property

All conservatives believe in protecting property rights, and most conservatives support the protection of copyright as an extension of that principle.

This assumes that property is analogous to intellectual property.

We favor an Internet that is largely free of regulation and taxes; we also favor observing the Eighth Commandment.

While there are a few crusaders against the very idea of intellectual property, there are few questions of principle at stake here, most reasonable people having long ago made up their minds about property rights (generally for) and censorship (generally against).

Unfortunately they miss that this is precisely the debate we need to have.

Property is material. A shovel is an object that exists in space and time. So is a car, and a table. Intellectual property is not material, it is information. Whether we consider copyright for written work; or patents for processes, machines and molecular shapes; we are not dealing with an object fixed in space and time. Thus the claim that these things actually are property, albeit intellectual property is incorrect. Now one may argue that such things should be safe-guarded for various reasons, but we need to establish these reasons. Asserting an analogy to property is not enough. Is the analogy valid? A smile is more similar to the words of a book than the paper is, yet no-one thinks that smiles should be subject to copyright laws.

The extension of property rights to intellectual property rights is not obvious regardless of the number of conservatives (or liberals) who subscribe to it. The terms may share the word "property" but that does not prevent the latter being a misnomer.

To discuss intellectual property one must grasp this distinction. Failure to understand the distinction renders one's opinion of little value, not because his opinions do not matter in general, but because he doesn't have the intellectual concepts needed to address the issue. It is similar to discussing causing death without reference to intent: if you don't understand that there is a difference between murder, self-defence, and manslaughter, how can you address such things?

A definition of information

Message theory has been variously defined in terms of how we recognise design, what information means, and how information can be measured.

German engineer Werner Gitt identifies 5 levels of information.

1. Statistics
2. Syntax
3. Semantics
4. Pragmatics
5. Apobetics

I understand the choice of the term "statistics" though I think a preferable term would be something like "storage," or perhaps "transmission quantity" (as storage media may be redundant).

The level of statistics is concerned with the possible options for each symbol and the number of symbols contained in the text block of interest. The number of symbols for binary are 2: 0,1. For English we have 27: letters and word space (punctuation and numbers excluded). For DNA we have 4: A, T, G, C.

Shannon's theory of information does analysis at this level. This level is completely devoid of any meaning, and Shannon may give higher values to messages with zero actual meaning, such as random numbers, than to meaningful statements.

Syntax is the choice of code. A deliberate, though arbitrary, convention of what groups of symbols mean. In English "cat" has meaning, but "ith" does not. And "come" has meaning in English and Italian, but not the same meaning. DNA at the gene level has the convention of codons; groups of 3 nucleotides such as CAC which codes for valine.

Semantics are at the level of communicating ideas. The code itself does not communicate ideas. We need words but we talk in sentences. It is at this level we have meaning. Further, it is at this level meaning is invariant. We could communicate the same idea in a different language which would use a different code (syntax) and result in different storage requirements (statistics).

It is at this level (at least) that information (meaning) needs to be considered when discussing gain and loss of information.

Gitt gives a useful illustration of semantics.

A: The bird singed the song.
B: The green freedom prosecuted the cerebrating house.

Sentence B is perfectly correct syntactically, but is semantically meaningless. In contrast, the semantics of sentence A is acceptable, but its syntax is erroneous.

Pragmatics is about action based on the ideas. And apobetics is about the purpose for the action.

Is important to note that much work has been done at the level of statistics. This is probably largely a result of the computer revolution; though possibly partly because this is the easiest level to define and analyse. But statistics does not discriminate meaning from non-meaning.

An analogy between information and energy

Information technology is a useful term. We store information and transfer it, all of which is helpful in understanding the information is not matter. However the association with storage capacity means that people may think in terms of size—number of bits—not the nature of what is stored.

This is somewhat analogous to talking about fuel tank capacity. Vehicles need energy to travel and all things being equal a larger fuel tank will supply more energy. But the issue here is energy. If one focuses on fuel tank size he can forget that it matters what is in the fuel tank. Different grades of gasoline contain different amounts of energy, and the same is true for other fuels such as methanol, ethanol, and coal. One can even fill a tank with substances that contain no energy such as sand or water (fusion disregarded). And other forms of energy such as electricity do not even require a petrol tank.

So while fuel tank size can be a proxy for energy, it may be inadequate, or even inappropriate. One must remember that it is energy that is being discussed.

Establishing the model before doing the maths

My recent post on information led to a call for a precise definition of what is meant by information. This request is eminently reasonable. I have yet to give an exact mathematical definition, or even an exact philosophical one. The reason is that "information" has a variety of meanings to different people; and the association with computing and information technology colours people's thinking.

Consider gravity. My understanding is that ideas about gravity around the time of Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton changed the way people thought about motion. Prior to then it was obvious that objects fell to the ground, but the Aristotelian rationale for such motion was that (some) objects tend toward the centre of the earth. And observations would support this claim. Post-Aristotelian physics described the same phenomena, but for a different reason: massive objects attract each other. The stone moves toward the earth, and the earth moves toward the stone; but the earth imperceptibly because of its immense size. Same observation (as much as perceptible) but different explanation.

The old theorem explains pendulums better. Pendulums tend to the centre of the earth so they stop after a time, not doing so immediately because the weight is moving when it gets to the lowest point. Newton's theory needs friction to explain the same observation; one could argue Newton is less parsimonious. However Newton was shown correct over time. And his theory was well defined, gave predictions, and was generalisable to the heavens.

My diversion was to highlight that the differences between the two approaches did not require them to be rigorously defined. The mass-attraction concepts antedated the maths by a significant amount of time; Newton had to invent maths for his theory! But a philosophical discussion on the merits of objects tending to the centre of the earth versus objects attracting is still very possible.

Similarly, it is possible to discuss other topics in general before rigour is attained, including information.

Information is a non-material concept that contains instructions thru language.

I use the term instruction somewhat broadly including being informed, not just commanded. That is, meaning of some form exists.

The importance of information in the evolution debate

Creationists often mention the concept of information as a challenge to the grand theory of evolution.

Information as a concept has long been recognised. It is something all people agree exists even if there is debate about how it is categorised. Archaeologists discovering inscriptions know there is a meaning even if they do not know what the meaning is, and most people would not dispute this. People recognise several things that are designed. Though one could say they do so because they already know these things are designed, such as a car or computer; there are examples of things we are not previously aware of, but we would still recognise intention.

As I have mentioned previously, information is not composed of, nor derived from matter. Of course it can be stored in matter.

There are several concepts of what information is, at least in terms of how we should represent information theory mathematically.

The application to evolution centres on the connection to DNA. DNA is recognised as carrying information. It has meaning. It resembles a blueprint, and metaphorically is one.

We can study how information originates. If the source of all information can be shown to be greater information (that is intelligence), then this conclusion also applies to DNA.

There are 2 potential ways that one could show information cannot be produced by itself. It may be possible to show this mathematically, in which case we can be absolutely certain (or essentially certain if the proof is statistical).

If not mathematically, it may be possible to show this empirically: that is, in investigating all the billions of examples of information that have been directly observed; if all are shown to have come from higher information sources and zero are self producing, then we can be extremely confident of our thesis.

Therefore the impossibility of information coming from non-information, mathematically or empirically, disproves Darwinism. Rather than being a red-herring as is sometimes claimed, information theory is absolutely central.

Message and matter

It is important to understand the fundamental difference between these 2 concepts. Matter is all around us. Everything physical in the universe is matter or energy and Einstein showed us that they are essentially interchangeable, at least in essence if not always in practice. The stars, the earth, the moon. All the objects on the earth, both animate and inanimate. All are material. Composed of atoms and/ or photons.

As such they obey the laws of physics. Mass attracts, objects fall, momentum and energy are conserved, and entropy increases. They all obey the laws of chemistry which at a foundational level are laws of physics for elements. Why the chemistry laws should be as they are, ie. could the elements theoretically be different, is a different question.

None of this is too complex to understand, neither is it modern. While the ancients may not have understood the scientific laws in such detail, the concept of the material was well understood. And the material was often distinguished from the spiritual.

What I think it very important to comprehend is that information is utterly distinct from matter and not reliant on it. It exists independent of matter and there is no reason to think it could not exist even if matter itself did not. Though the existence of matter without information is unlikely to be possible.

Information or intelligence is difficult to quantify, though it can be done. Information is frequently stored in matter but it is in no way dependant on the matter in which it is stored. This post as you read it is stored magnetically on your hard-drive, having been copied from a server elsewhere. However it could be printed and stored in toner on paper. Or you could memorise it and it would be stored in your neurons. But the message is not derived nor is dependant on magnetism, paper, ink or anything else composed of matter.

This concept is fundamental. And it has significant implications.

1. It means that the 2 (message and matter) are to be distinguished from each other, something that may not be done in defending various theories.
2. They are not derived from each other. Information cannot make material and material cannot make information.
3. We need a source for both matter and information.
4. The laws that govern information are not those that govern matter. Information does not obey the law of gravity, it does not contain momentum, it cannot be transformed to energy.

Expanding on item 2: One might argue that a powerful source of information can create matter, but this is a being, not just an idea.

Information that appears to arise from matter is merely the level of information that already exists in the matter, it is not created by the matter. The limited information to describe a crystal structure is intrinsic to the information already contained within the physics and chemistry of the molecules.

Note that the crystal structure of salt is low information content and no more than can be known from our (potential) understanding of sodium, chloride, solutions and temperature. However deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) has information that is imposed on it which is not intrinsic to nucleic acids, sugar bases, or phosphate. One can transcribe the code onto a computer or paper and the code remains intact.

The design argument

The heavens declare the glory of God,/
and the sky above proclaims his handiwork. (Psalm 19:1)

In essence this is straightforward. In everyday life it is apparent that many things are designed by men. We recognise design. And we know that designed objects have a designer. The parallel is that we see many other things that are not designed by men but are clearly designed.

We recognise design by purpose or intent. While a splatter painting may have been drawn by an artist there is no clear intent so whether or no it was designed is not clearly apparent. However the more intent something has the more clearly it was designed.

Information content is a helpful way of assessing design. The higher the information content the more obvious it is designed. Information is based on specification and complexity. So if something is ordered it is not particularly complex. If something is complex based on the number of bits to store it, it is may or may not be specified. So storing 100 addresses is specific, 100 random letters is not. A measure of information can be made by the the storage capacity required to hold the generator of the data. For a story it is the data (ie. every single letter, though thru lossless compression it may be possible to minimise information content) as a story is specified and not predictable. However large quantity data that is predictable (⅓ in decimal), calculable (π, e) or random has a low information content.

The issue with random numbers or noise needs more explanation. It is low information because describing a random number generator requires little information. To describe any single random number will require as much data as an equivalent length story. The reason this is not high information is that it lacks any specificity. The binary data that describes a jpeg picture may appear random but it is specific, it stores data about a specific object.

People don't perform these calculations rigorously but as information content ranges over multiple orders of magnitude design is easily recognised. A smoothed rock is easily distinguishable from a carving. We can tell a painting from spilled paint (usually). We know that a book has an author.

So it is clear that design can be seen even if the designer is not known. The existence of a designer can be inferred from design. So when one sees all the design in this world that is not from the hands of man the logical conclusion is that a designer exists and he is other than man. One may claim this designer is other than the Grand Designer; whether that be an angel, a lesser god of a pantheon, an extraterrestrial being. But whatever the immediate source, these beings are still creatures and the ultimate source must be the Creator.