Brain death

In an earlier post some years back Blair D raised the question of brain death. He mentioned those who are considered brain dead

I have never known of a person diagnosed as brain dead to breathe, in a manner consistent with life sustaining way, for very long. In other words the brain dead person has commenced the process of dying.

and those in a persistent vegetative state

To the clinicians and she was as good as dead in that she was deemed to have none of the higher brain functions remaining intact and therefore was described as a "living brain stem" but no more. No ability to perceive, experience (to give meaning to) and or communicate in any way.

One needs to be careful how death, including brain death, is defined, this should not be happening,

Stephen Thorpe, then 17, was placed in a medically-induced coma following a multi-car pileup....

Although a team of four physicians insisted that his son was “brain-dead” following the wreck, Thorpe’s father enlisted the help of a general practitioner and a neurologist, who demonstrated that his son still had brain wave activity.  The doctors agreed to bring him out of the coma, and five weeks later Thorpe left the hospital, having almost completely recovered.

Today, the 21-year-old with “brain damage” is studying accounting at a local university.

Now many people whose brains are non-functional following trauma never recover, they fail to wake up ever. However because some do wake up, perhaps brain death may not be the best way to define death. This position is consistent with what I understand the biblical definition of death to be. If we are going to have "brain death" then we need to have absent brain function. If there is no brain function then such a person will stop breathing because breathing is controlled by the brain. (The heart is affected by the brain but can continue to function without brain input.) Heart cessation will occur shortly following breathing cessation.

Then why not call brain death a form of death when there is no brain activity in the region that causes respiration? Perhaps medically this could be a definition. However the situation could arise where the breathing centre of the brain has some damage (temporary or permanent) but the person retains higher cognitive functions. He will then be aware that his breathing is being maintained artificially (similar to high neck injuries). So for brain death we need evidence of minimal brain activity, no awareness, and lack of respiratory effort. Even with all these we cannot be certain of irreversibility and people can be maintained in this situation for years. Contra cardiac cessation which is permanent after several minutes (somewhat depending on the temperature).

If we accept that death is cardiac (plus or minus respiratory), where does that leave us with those who are considered brain dead or others who are in a persistent vegetative state?

This is actually a different question to whether or not brain death is death. I would phrase the question: Can we withhold medical treatment from a minimally conscious person who is unlikely to recover?

Which raises another question: What is medical treatment?

The answer to the first question is a guarded yes. If a person is thought to be permanently brain damaged and is in an induced coma the least one should do is "wake" him up. Assessment of response to stimuli should involve significant stimuli in the absence of sedation. But if there is strong evidence for irreversible brain damage and no response to stimuli (without sedation) and the person is without consciousness, then I see no ethical command to maintain life using ongoing medical treatment. This is not to say that  providing such medical treatment is necessarily immoral, rather that there is not an automatic moral responsibility to maintain life artificially indefinitely.

Which leads to the second question: What is medical treatment? If a person is unable to breathe then the removal of ventilation will lead to cessation of respiration followed shortly by cardiac arrest and death. If a person is able to breathe then they may continue to live for several days but die from kidney failure without fluid. The provision of air via an artificial respirator is considered medical treatment because it is a high-tech intervention. The provision of water and food via a feeding tube is not considered high-tech and it is often assumed that this is not a medical intervention but providing the essentials of life. However the respirator is also providing an essential of life: oxygen. That a respirator happens to be more complex than a tube is morally irrelevant. What is relevant is that we are providing air or water or food for the patient. That the person cannot breathe for themselves or swallow for themselves means that we are providing not just vitals for life but the mechanism of receiving vitals.

Brain death may not be the best definition of death. There is no moral duty to maintain medical treatment for someone who is brain dead. Medical treatment is providing the mechanism of receiving the vitals of life regardless of how high-tech that mechanism is.

The right to promiscuity

Ex-feminist Kristen Hatten gave a speech to a pro-life group on the connection between Marxism and feminism. A moderately interesting read; interesting that she was not familiar with the history of communism until more recently. This suggests that a large number of people, and especially Millennials, may be ignorant of the evils of Stalin and Mao and not nearly cautious enough about socialist and atheist ideology.

Unrelated to communism but commenting about attaching the pro-life movement to other objectives she mentions a scene from King of the Hill which is somewhat perceptive

There was one episode where Bobby, the little boy, got really into Christian ROCK. His mom was all for it, because she was just happy her boy was into Jesus. But the dad, old uptight Hank Hill, wasn't into it. And the entire episode you're sitting there thinking, c'mon Hank, lighten up! So there's a little bit of ROCK involved. He's still loving Jesus!

At the end of the episode Hank takes his son into the garage and hands him this box and says open it up. And inside the box are all these lame old things that Bobby used to think were cool. Like, imagine Pokemon being in that box in like ten years, although Pokemon may never die, it seems. But Bobby looks at all these old toys and says, “Yeah, these are lame, I was such a baby.”

And Hank says, “Son, one day soon, this Christian ROCK is going to go into this box. And I don't want Jesus going in there with it.” 

Now this may have been as much of a slur—an unwarranted one—on Christian rock music. Nor are these types of concerns necessarily likely to actualise. Though it does remind us to keep the central things central.

Considering abortion: recently there has been media coverage of women protesting the president in the United States. Other than the odd idea that women's liberty amounts to little more than unfettered access to abortion, modern protest signs and props for solidarity among women are most intriguing. This is not new but I had not noticed the connection before.

Modern women protest with a focus on vaginas; the ignorance of many, including adult women, of the difference between a vulva and a vagina not withstanding. The vagina is the symbol. Rhetorically this focuses on coitus. Women are justifying their sexual liberty and condemning those who would restrict sex. The focus is on the right to promiscuity. We see the same message in a slut walk.

Except this symbol has not been the focus of womanhood previously. The symbols of a women were not vaginas but wombs and breasts. The focus was not on the ability to have sex, rather the ability to conceive and carry a child. And after birth to nurture through nursing. This change kind of makes sense in a perverse way. The freedom to have sex and avoid pregnancy, or remove the child if one inadvertently gets pregnant, would not well be served by the symbols of fertility, parity and lactation.

Equivocating on law

The comparison between laws of nature and moral law is a useful one however I fear there is a degree of equivocation that goes ignored.

We have a creator who is also a lawgiver; we are to love the Lord our God and our neighbours, amongst other things. We are moral creatures are are to submit to our maker. He requires of us and we do best to obey him. As such these laws are rules we are to commanded to obey; ordinances that are prescriptive: you shall do, you shall not do; you may, you may not. As free creatures we are able to acquiesce, or not. That is, there is the possibility of disobedience.

The ancients applied the idea of standards to the natural world. Our world is orderly because our God is orderly and immutable. God made the world a certain way and the planets continue to orbit the sun which continues to emit its light. Matter and energy obey their laws, but such laws (in as much that they are correct interpretations of nature) are descriptive not prescriptive.

In the case of men we study habits and generalise common behaviours as "laws": descriptions of how people tend to act. But the descriptive law that thirsty people seek out drink is distinct from the prescriptive law that says it is wrong to steal someone's drink.

Perhaps the physical laws are rules, and matter cannot but obey its maker. We have laws to describe matter doing what God prescribes matter to do. Though some laws may be corollaries of fundamental constructs. God created space and time and matter and light, but the inverse square law may just reflect the geometry of 3 dimensional Euclidean space: a constant force will be diluted if it acts from a point out into 3 dimensions but the inverse square of the distance. Now it seems that the natural world could have been otherwise in which case the laws would have been different. But the physical laws would reflect how God intended that world would act. But even if physical laws are in some way prescriptive from God's perspective, moral commands are prescriptive in a different way. They are commands to free creatures that can love and obey, or refuse to. We must be careful we do not let the analogy of physical law to moral law get away on us.

Being good for God or goodness?

Previously I argued that atheists do need God to be moral, even as they argue their moral superiority in not needing God to tell them not to murder. As an example of the latter Dawkins has said

I would rather meet somebody who is good for the sake of being good, rather than for the sake of sucking up to an imaginary friend.

Ignoring that the righteous man does good for the sake of goodness because he loves God.

However I think I would rather meet the man who does right because God says so. There are sins that I am less likely to commit because, by God's grace, I do not find them enticing. Yet there are some things that my sin nature does entice me to do. Knowing God disapproves is the reason I am less likely to do wrong. For all the atheists who do not sin in the way I am tempted to (because they struggle with different temptations), what of those who do struggle the way I do? Is it better to meet them wanting to behave badly and thinking this is okay, than to meet a God-fearer refraining from such actions because he knows that they are wrong?

I do not deny that Christians do sin. But it seems it is better that a man who does good and refrains from sin for the sake of God, rather than for the sake of what he happens to think is good.

Do atheists need to believe in God to be moral?

The traditional answer to this is that Christians are not claming that atheists are immoral without God, they are arguing that God must exist for morality to be true. We need an objective source that says that all people have oughts. Without God the oughts are arbitrary. If there is no God then all the oughts come down to reasons like maximising happiness, minimising harm, treating others how you wish to be treated. The problem with this is we are relying on ideas like happiness and altruism are good, and pain is bad. While I generally agree with this, why is this so? If someone else believes that his happiness takes preference over group happiness what can the atheist appeal to? Or who? We are left with people disagreeing.

The moral argument is that if morality is real (not just an arbitrary collection of principles we agree to live by, but can change or abandon) then there is a moral giver. The existence of morality is evidence for God. Consistent atheists realise this and often become nihilists. Though I suspect all men still know that some things are wrong.

Atheists can act morally because they are made in the image of God. Our conscience means that we know there are oughts. This is why the atheist wishes to have a reason for morality: he knows oughts are real, but his worldview denies a deity.

So the Christian argument is that atheism doesn't have an explanation of morality, not that the atheist is immoral. Nevertheless, I think there is reason to suspect that atheists on average are less moral. There are biblical reasons to suspect this, but I wish to raise a more pragmatic one.

Atheist morality frequently reflects the culture (Christians can also be unduly influenced by culture and agree with culture over Scripture). So the atheist call is that they can be just as moral as Christians; moreover, they often argue a superiority because they do not need a deity to tell them not to murder whereas Christians supposedly need God to prevent them killing others.

Of course this is not true. If God gives man his conscience then God is telling the atheist not to murder as much as he tells the Christian. The atheist pretension to superiority backfires as not only does he also require God to tell him right and wrong (by his conscience) he acts immorally by denying his Creator.

But there is a bigger reason the atheist is more immoral? Atheist morality is generally reflective of culture. The Christian thinks that murder and theft and lying are wrong. Atheists will generally agree these things are wrong—we are just as moral as Christians but don't need God! Yet God also condemns many other things. Murder of children is wrong in or out of the womb, sodomy is wrong, government overreach is wrong. Western culture, despite its Christian heritage, by and large has rejected these laws. The atheist who says he is as moral as the Christian because he disapproves of murder and theft is not as moral when it comes to abortion or sodomy. Worse, he condemns the Christian who, despite the culture, recognises these legal actions as sins against God. The Christian is condemned by the atheist as holding to bigoted views that oppress others. Further, the atheist now argues that he is morally superior to the Christian in these areas. But all the atheist has to go on is the spirit of the age. He only has his conscience to bear witness: his conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse him (Rom 2:15).

So atheists can be moral. The atheist has a conscience that is given to him by God, even while he denies the God who made him. His conscience is somewhat reflective of the culture (or sub-culture) he belongs to and so his morality variably lines up with God's law. And because atheists suppress the knowledge of God many eventually abandon God's law.

Hierarchal structures and submission

I was discussing the nature of authority to my daughter several years ago, and who she is to obey when she gets conflicting requests by those in authority over her.

Scripture teaches that people are to submit to authority as is appropriate. There are several examples given in the Bible. Men to God, citizens to the king or the state, children to parents, slaves to masters, church members to elders. And by analogy other situations such as employees to employers.

I think there is a good argument to be made to obey authorities in most situations, even if the authority is not righteous. I will not defend this position here, it is a common position among Christians, though I am aware there are arguments otherwise.

Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God’s servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God’s wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be in subjection, not only to avoid God’s wrath but also for the sake of conscience. For because of this you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God, attending to this very thing. Pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed. (Romans 13)

The question arises about what someone should do when he is commanded something that conflicts with a higher authority he is answerable to.

While we are answerable to those above us, we may also be answerable to those above them. The basic structure I see is this:

1. God
2. Government
3. Citizens
4. Children

And there are different structures within this. The church as a whole is not under the government, but individuals within the church are (in this age).

Some structures are voluntary and others compulsory. Compulsory structures may change. All governments are always under God, as are all men. Christians are under their elders, but they are free to leave their local church, or even Christianity. Slaves are not free to leave, but employees are. Children become adults and are no longer answerable to their parents. A voluntary structure does not permit you to disobey your superiors, though you are free to leave the structure if you find their requirements repulsive.

The flow of authority means that people are permitted to disobey an immediate authority if obedience to him means disobedience to a higher authority. However it must result in disobedience to the higher authority, not just inconsistent with his preferences. Further, you must also be under the higher authority.

So if you are a slave to a soldier who is under a commander, but you are not answerable to the commander in any way, then you do not need to take the commander's objection into consideration in your obedience to the soldier. Though it may be prudent to consider the likely consequences.

If you are also answerable to the commander, and the request of the soldier is inconsistent with how the commander would act, but performing such a task would not mean you are disobeying the commander, then the duty to obey remains in effect.

One can transfer authority. When discussing this with my daughter I used the example of school. I transfer my authority over my daughter to the teachers and principal during her time at school. The teachers are not under my authority at all. Still, because I am the primary authority over my daughter, she is allowed to disobey her teachers in deference to me.

It is also important to note that people have authority if they are delegated it, not because they are part of a structure. In a monarchy the king is the ultimate authority (under God), but the king's attendants do not necessarily carry any power. A person working for the state does not have intrinsic authority based on his employment, it is based on his position. So a policeman or a judge has authority delegated by the state, and government teacher does not.

This is how I see God has set up the authority structures on earth. And while it is appropriate to disobey an authority to obey a higher one,

But Peter and the apostles answered, "We must obey God rather than men...." (Acts 5),

it is important that this only be the case when obedience to the lower authority would constitute active disobedience to higher one. There are many situations where authorities abuse their power and request things that are not ideal, things that a better steward would not command of his subjects. But it is these authorities who are answerable to those above them. It is no sin to obey a wicked ruler in some of his poorer rulings, in fact it may be a sin not to obey him.

Acting against our convictions

While there are arguments concerning the public and private funding of health, I would like to pick up on the more sinister aspects around recent court rulings that many on the right and some on the left have seen: concerning to corporations funding contraceptives. Note that some oppose contraceptives because they view artificial contraception as immoral, others do not oppose contraception in principle but believe that certain contraceptives destroy embryos and thus destroy human life.

Julian Sanchez who does not personally oppose contraception or contraceptive abortifacients notes that the ruling (not to fund contraception) is cost neutral for various reasons including that pregnancy cover is more expensive than providing free contraceptives. He shrewdly comments,

In light of this, the outraged reaction to the ruling ought to seem a bit puzzling. If what you are fundamentally concerned about is whether women have access to no-copay contraception, then there’s no obvious reason to invest such deep significance in the precise accounting details of the mechanism by which it is provided. You might even be heartened by a ruling that so centrally turns on the premise that accomodation for religious objectors is required when no women will lack such coverage who would have enjoyed it under a mandate.

The outrage does make sense, of course, if what one fundamentally cares about—or at least, additionally cares about—is the symbolic speech act embedded in the compulsion itself. In other words, if the purpose of the mandate is not merely to achieve a certain practical result, but to declare the qualms of believers with religious objections so utterly underserving [sic] of respect that they may be forced to act against their convictions regardless of whether this makes any real difference to the outcome. And something like that does indeed seem to be lurking just beneath—if not at—the surface of many reactions. The ruling seems to provoke anger, not because it will result in women having to pay more for birth control (as it won’t), but at least in part because it fails to send the appropriate cultural signal. Or, at any rate, because it allows religious employers to continue sending the wrong cultural signal—disapproval of certain forms of contraception—when sending that signal does not impede the achievement of the government’s ends in any way.

He states that opponents contraceptive coverage are undeserving of respect and therefore it is viewed as acceptable to force them to act against their convictions.

In my mind the 2 concepts are not logically associated. One can have no respect for an idea or a person without compelling behaviour. Lacking respect is frequently justified. But my lack of respect (if warranted) means that I can disregard a person's foolish claims, not that I can force him to adopt my preferences. You do not get to force people to act against their convictions because you do not respect them. You do not even get to do that if you are correct and they are mistaken. Making a man act against what he strongly believes is to coerce him into sin. It is making him do something that he believes will offend God. Regardless of whether he discerns the issue rightly or wrongly, to make him offend God is forcing him to blaspheme.

I suspect many people including Christians fail to recognise how diabolical—and I choose that word intentionally—forcing men to blaspheme is. Such a man does not care for the opinion of God for if he did he would not try and make another do something he thinks offends God. It is akin to idolatry, though of the very worst form that tries to make others idolaters as well.

Damon Linker classifies himself as liberal: seemingly in both the modern and classic sense. I am not so certain he fully apprehends the issue, but he gets aspects of it.

On a range of issues, liberals seem not only increasingly incapable of comprehending how or why someone would affirm a more traditional vision of the human good, but inclined to relegate dissenters to the category of moral monsters who deserve to be excommunicated from civilized life — and sometimes coerced into compliance by the government.

And why might this be? Linker suggests,

From the dawn of the modern age, religious thinkers have warned that, strictly speaking, secular politics is impossible — that without the transcendent foundation of Judeo-Christian monotheism to limit the political sphere, ostensibly secular citizens would begin to invest political ideas and ideologies with transcendent, theological meaning.

Put somewhat differently: Human beings will be religious one way or another. Either they will be religious about religious things, or they will be religious about political things. 

Thus secularism (presumably left or right) tends toward idolatry.

Blasphemers often claim their demands are reasonable. Just a little incense to Caesar and you can worship your God the rest of the year.

Requests to affirm Islam (a false God), or provide health (and cover the cost of murder), or just bake a cake (affirming the goodness of sodomy); are all considered by many as competing claims against God. As I have written previously, forcing men to blaspheme is amongst the most grievous of sins. Not only must we avoid such coercion, we must oppose our ideological allies when they support such measures.

Civilian casualties in the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict

During a previous Israeli/ Palestinian conflict I wrote on civilian deaths in war. One cannot solely tally the number of deaths, one needs to consider intention.

Intention is important. One can argue whether or not an army deliberately targeting civilians is legitimate in war. The West generally condemns this action as morally wrong. While I am in general agreement with this, one could make an argument that it may be dependant on the choices "enemy" civilians make. But if we accept that intentional targeting of civilians is immoral then those who do so carry the guilt even if they are unsuccessful in their intent. That is, if they miss the target or strike the target but it has been evacuated such that no one is killed, the intent and attempt at civilian death is present. They should be thought of and treated similarly to any other group which accomplishes intentional civilian massacre. The lack of achievement of their goals does not remove their culpability.

Addressing civilian deaths in the current conflict,

Both [UN Secretary-General] Ban and the Obama administration took Israel to task for the mounting civilian death toll in Gaza.

This is misguided. This is a superficial approach looking at actual deaths and not intent.

Israel targets Hamas rockets thus minimising civilian death of its own population. It also uses various strategies to decrease Palestinian civilian casualties such as warning to stay out on an area, announcing targets ahead of time, using accurate targeting, agreeing to ceasefires for aid.

Hamas policy is to target civilian areas without warning thus attempting to maximise Israeli civilian death. It has also conducted military action in ways that are likely to increase Palestinian civilian casualties or encourage the use of human shields.

The greater number of Palestinian civilian casualties is due to more effective Israeli defence and their greater firepower. Israel is attempting to minimise civilian casualties on both sides and Hamas is attempting to increase civilian casualties on both sides. Ban and the Obama administration's complaints are directed toward the wrong side.

The laws of nature

This article puts together several ideas that I have been pondering over the years but have not written much about or with such clarity. Doyle covers important issues such as:

• The limited relationship between physical laws and judicial law
• The moral nature of judicial law
• The descriptive but non-prescriptive nature of physical law
• How physical law represents God's general upholding of the universe
• How miracles represent God's special activity in the universe
• That miracles are impossible is a specious argument
• That the term "methodological naturalism" is polemical, and unhelpful

Concerning methodological naturalism and science, Doyle not only notes that the term "methodological naturalism" invokes philosophical naturalism ("naturalism" being the shortened form) because they sound similar, methodological naturalism is not even accurate because naturalism does not imply regularity—why should we expect an ordered universe? I think a more useful term for science is empirical induction. Such a term would make scientific fields much narrower though increase clarity. Much of cosmology, palaeontology, archaeology and many other disciplines would come under the umbrella of inferred history.

I would like to add a thought on law. It is not clear than the physical laws are informational rather than just geometrical. The descriptions of such laws are informational, but the laws themselves may not be. I think that they are but that they have low information content. High information content occurs in designed objects such as flowers and people. And morality, while containing information, is more than information. That is, we have matter (and related qualities such as space and time) and the physical laws that describe how they behave; we have message which represents complex objects; and we have morals which specify how conscious objects are to behave.

An excellent article that I wish I had written.

Defining arguments away—the distorted language of secularism

by Shaun Doyle

Abstract

One of the means that secularists have used to achieve dominance in the culture over the last 250 years has been the manipulation of language. Key terms have been modified, and new terms coined, which slant the ‘rules of engagement’ between Christianity and secularism against Christianity. Three terms in particular: ‘natural law’, ‘miracle’, and ‘methodological naturalism’ have been affected. If we do not expose and correct this sophistry, an honest debate is not possible. At root, these issues reflect the clash between worldviews that must ultimately be accepted for reasons outside of science.

‘The laws of nature’—confusion and caution

One of the most common ways to talk about well-established scientific ideas is to refer to them as ‘the laws of nature’, ‘natural law/s’, or ‘scientific law/s’. These phrases conjure up notions of an orderly universe, and convey the idea that science can teach us much about the universe. The notion of ‘law’ can be a helpful metaphor for understanding the regularity we see in how the universe works, but it is just a metaphor.

One thing true of all metaphors is that they are only helpful to a point before they break down. They do so because, from the point of view of formal logic, all metaphors break the law of non-contradiction. When they are pushed too far, different things end up equated in ways that amount to false statements. For example, saying “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s gentleness equates the physical softness of the teddy bear with the gentle character of Mark, which amounts to saying that Mark has a gentle character. However, saying that “Mark is a teddy bear” with reference to Mark’s physical makeup does not work because Mark, a human, is clearly not made of stuffing! Not all the attributes of teddy bears can be attributed to Mark, and vice versa. This doesn’t invalidate the use of metaphors because everyone intuitively knows this, and we don’t use a metaphor to say that two different things are logically identical—only that they are identical in some significant and relevant property in a particular sense.

‘Natural law’ is itself a metaphor for the regularities of the physical world drawn from the concept of human law. Moreover, it’s a natural metaphor to draw, given a sovereign moral Lawgiver who also upholds His creation in an orderly way (figure 1). The regularities of nature are so regular that they seem to reflect some principle that the matter itself cannot transgress, like how people cannot transgress a human law. However, the notions of obedience and transgression are themselves concepts that most properly apply to the behaviour of moral agents—a concept which does not apply to inanimate matter and energy. That is one of many ways that human laws are not identical to ‘natural laws’, and presents an area where the metaphor breaks down.

Are ‘natural laws’ prescriptive?

However, as people jettisoned the Bible and its doctrine of providence and came to accept a ‘fuzzy positivism’ in its place from the 19^th century onwards, many people seemed to forget that the notion of ‘natural law’ is just a metaphor. Because of this, and that the metaphor is so fitting, we have forgotten to pay attention to those areas where the regularities of nature do not correspond to human laws. Failure to recognize the metaphorical nature of ‘natural law’ has brought undue confusion over how the world actually works. The problem is that people often conceive of ‘the laws of nature’ as materially equivalent to human laws. If someone does what human law forbids, it is described as ‘breaking’ or ‘violating’ the law. People then apply this same notion of law to ‘the laws of nature’, and consider a miracle in the same way they consider an illegal act—as if some precept has been ‘broken’ or ‘violated’. The biggest mistake people make when they equate ‘natural law’ and human law is that they make natural law prescriptive. However, there are two major errors with understanding the concept of ‘natural law’ like this.

First, when people think of ‘natural laws’ as prescriptive, there is in fact a subtle but significant difference in what ‘prescriptive’ connotes in comparison to human laws. Human laws are prescriptive messages—they are coded information. Human laws are not inextricably bound to any given physical form—one can communicate the law “you shall not murder” in any human language, and in numerous different physical formats (e.g. writing on a piece of paper, Morse code, speech, etc.). Moreover, a human law cannot render the act of murder physically impossible. Herein lies the difference—when ‘natural law’ is seen as prescriptive, it is not conceived of as merely coded information, but is something materially able to make certain states of affairs physically impossible. However, ascribing ‘natural law’ a tangible existence like this commits the fallacy of reification, which treats abstract concepts as concrete objects. ‘Natural law’ is an abstract concept—it is coded information, like human laws, which formally describes regular patterns observed in nature. As such, ‘natural laws’ have no more power to cause the regularities of nature than a redraw of a map of New Zealand can change the physical coastline.

Second, although human laws and ‘natural laws’ are both coded information, they are different types of messages. Human laws prescribe what people should and should not do, e.g. the law forbidding murder. The law itself says nothing about how people actually act—it is a command, not a statement of fact. ‘The laws of nature’ are different: they are formal descriptions of regular patterns observed in nature—i.e. they are statements of fact. They either correspond with reality or they do not. However, it is meaningless to apply the notion of correspondence with reality to a human law such as forbidding murder, because it is an imperative command, not a statement of fact. Conversely, the statement: “murder is ethically wrong” is a statement of (ethical) fact, and is generally implied to form the basis for the law forbidding murder. This means ‘the laws of nature’ are not formally prescriptive, and are more accurately seen as descriptive concepts.

Read the rest here

Some preliminary thoughts on abortion

I suspect this debate has as much emotion and commitment to a preferred outcome as it does to reason. Still, some remarks are in order. The pro-abortionists argue for liberty and the anti-abortionists for life. Where is the debate to begin. I think both can be addressed and no preferential order needs to be chosen ahead of time. We can discuss both choice and life issues and see how they relate to each other.

Liberty is a reasonable good. All things being equal freedom seems a desirable state. So the pro-abortion argument goes: a woman has right over her own body and the choice to keep any fetus she conceives, or not, should be hers to make as it affects her life currently and in the future if she chooses to keep her child. More so, a fetus cannot make moral demands on the mother to keep it alive.

There are a couple of difficulties with this view. A fetus is not making demands, it is in a situation not of its own making, and requires such nourishment as part of normal development. It is not in a state of illness, nor is it asking for others to bear the cost for negative decisions it made previously.

Continuing with the liberty argument, it seems reasonable to allow adults to make many choices that affect their life. Food they eat, clothes they wear, where they live, how they entertain themselves. But liberties are not absolute. One should not have the freedom to spend other people's money, use their goods without permission, threaten their lives and property in the course of seeking one's own welfare and pleasure. So the question is whether, after conception, the mother should have unrestrained liberty and treat the fetus like a food preference or an item of clothing—to be kept or removed; or have her liberty constrained because the fetus is (or is similar to) the property or life of another.

If the fetus can be considered property, the question is whose property? If we consider it is owned by the mother then it would seem that it is also owned by the father. The physical cost of the child during gestation is not as costly on the father as it is on the mother, but if the fetus is joint owned by the father it can hardly be disposed of without his permission.

The above may read harshly to anti-abortionists but I have tried to assess the possible arguments that may arise. I make no defence that a fetus is in fact property, but for those who deny that the issue is one of life, the property consideration still needs to be faced. And I use the word fetus rather than child so that the argument is no pre-empted by disputed language. Of course it is usual for an expectant mother to refer to her "child" or "baby" even still in the womb.

This brings us to the anti-abortion contention that the issue is one of life: the fetus is in fact a person. This indeed is the crux of the issue. If the anti-abortionists are correct about this then the liberty arguments are null. One does not have the freedom to kill an innocent person to maximise his own freedom, inside or outside the womb.

In this argument over life there are several terms to define. We are not arguing whether the fetus is human: a human in contrast to a non-human such as a chicken or a flower. The fetus is clearly human. It is produced by humans and has a full complement of the human genome. Nor are we arguing whether the fetus is living. If it weren't living it would be dead, or an inanimate object like a pebble. What we are arguing is whether the fetus is a person. Cadavers are human, but not living. They are not persons (in this sense). Elephants are living but not human. They are not persons. Children and adults are humans and living. They are also considered persons. The question that needs to be answered is, What makes personhood? Is being human and living equivalent to personhood? If so then personhood starts at conception. If there is more to personhood than humanness and life we must identify it. When does a conceptus become a person? This is a question even liberty proponents must answer. One cannot be pro-choice for murder.

Business and conscience

Among the many news sources and blog posts concerning rights of businesses and rights of homosexuals I came across Kristen Powers' column.

Similar bills have cropped up in a half-dozen states in an effort to protect anti-gay religious believers against lawsuits. A florist in Washington state, a Colorado baker and a New Mexico photographer have been sued for refusing to serve gay couples getting married. They say to do so would be to "celebrate" nuptials at odds with their Christian faith.

It has a mildly mocking tone. She coauthors another article here. There have been several considered responses to this issue around the web.

The best solution to this issue is to allow any business owner to do business with any person, or not, as he sees fit.

In my own country when legalising marriage was being debated such conscience clauses were requested so a celebrant would not be forced to participate in ceremonies. It was argued exception clauses would not be required as no one would be forced to.

What many fail to see is that the issue is not just about the morality of a specific issue, it is whether it affects our conscience even if we are incorrect. So the arguments are often over whether sodomy is eumoral, or whether what we are required to do is reasonable, rather than freedom of conscience. Powers argues the second case, that baking a cake specifically for a gay wedding is a reasonable requirement for a Christian,

Whether Christians have the legal right to discriminate should be a moot point because Christianity doesn't prohibit serving a gay couple getting married. Jesus calls his followers to be servants to all. Nor does the Bible call service to another an affirmation.

Yet Christ's call to servanthood is for us to yield our desire to live for ourselves and instead submit to him, in doing so we live for others. But this is not a call for others to demand of us what they desire.

Powers gives the false comparison to prison ministry which ironically argues against her point,

Christians serve unrepentant murderers through prison ministry. So why can't they provide a service for a same-sex marriage?

Christians do prison ministry of their own volition and serve prisoners how they perceive what is best and not the prisoners. A Christian who owns a gun shop should be perfectly within his right to refuse to sell a gun to a murderer after he has served his time. To do business with a sinner is not in itself sinful. To engage in business with someone as he is sinning in order to aid him in his sin, can be participating in his sin. The distinction is quite clear: a doctor can treat a homosexual with HIV infection and at the same time refuse to help a lesbian with assisted reproduction.

But Christians need to recognise the bigger issue here, the issue of conscience. If a person thinks a behaviour offends God he should be free to refrain, even if he is wrong about God's opinion. For example, I see no need to force a Jehovah's witness to receive a blood transfusion even though I think he is completely misguided about the interpretation of Leviticus 17. If someone believes that baking a cake or photographing homosexual celebrations is to affirm a behaviour he thinks is sinful then to him it is sinful and he should not be forced to act in such a matter. To make a man act against his conscience is to force him to sin against God (from his perspective). It is an attempt to make him blaspheme. As I have written before, such political policies are draconian.

Loving sinners?

I note that conservatives are sometimes labelled haters for their opposition to practitioners of sin. Now the situation is complicated, not the least being challenging men in the public sphere who promote evil is not incompatible with compassion, overlooking sin, or offering grace in the private sphere. Nevertheless, the accusation may be true at times.

What I think is neglected in this debate, especially when it is Christians accusing Christians of lack of charity, is the attitude of the fault-finders toward sin.

Consider several of the topics often associated with conservatism; opposition to: abortion, public welfare, sexual immorality, aspects of public education, liberal media. (Leaving aside the fact these can be framed positively and that other topics have not been included). When conservatives oppose these issues they are frequently accused of hating the people that engage in such activities. This may be contrasted with Jesus' command to love.

Now Jesus does call us to love all men including our enemies. Christians who fail to love their political opponents are not in line with Jesus' commands here. If we are not loving we should take note of such challenges.

Nevertheless, I think that conservative Christians do frequently act lovingly toward such people in their private engagements. My complaint is that (politically) liberal Christians who make such accusations seem to approve of pagan behaviour that conservatives oppose, or at least they consider such behaviour as a minor infraction.

If this is the case then liberals can hardly claim the moral high-ground. Which is more praiseworthy? Loving someone despite the fact you think his behaviour is evil; or loving someone because you think he really is not that bad, or even that his behaviour is perfectly acceptable.

Which is harder, loving a woman who has had an abortion when you think that she has murdered someone, or loving her because you think her situation was difficult and the abortion was no big deal?

I am not attempting to justify conservative Christians hating their enemies. Jesus tells us this is not an option. But you cannot accuse others of being haters and justify yourself when your opinion of the morality of various actions differs from your opponent. The question is: Do you hate those whose morality you truly disagree with? How do you treat dog-fighters, and paedophiles, and people who don't recycle.

Fiction fabrication

The Guardian reports a survey on lying about reading books.

A recent survey of 2,000 people suggests that the majority of people pretend to have read classic books in order to appear more intelligent, with more than half of those polled displaying unread books on their shelves and 3% slipping a highbrow cover on books they'd rather not be seen reading in public.

The list (percentage of respondents lying)

1. 1984 by George Orwell (26%)
2. War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy (19%)
3. Great Expectations by Charles Dickens (18%)
4. The Catcher in the Rye by JD Salinger (15%)
5. A Passage to India by EM Forster (12%)
6. Lord of the Rings by JRR Tolkien (11%)
7. To Kill A Mocking Bird by Harper Lee (10%)
8. Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky (8%)
9. Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austen (8%)
10. Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bronte (5%)

Though one would ask, "Why lie?" You may end up in a conversation with someone who had read the book and show yourself ignorant of the contents. And who did they survey? Guardian readers? One quarter of all people lying about reading the book 1984 seems a little high? Further, I never assume that a book on a shelf in a house means the owner has read it. I haven't read all the books on my shelves.

Of the above I have read

1. 1984
2. Great Expectations
3. Lord of the Rings
4. To Kill A Mocking Bird

No plans on reading the others at this stage though it may be prudent to reread 1984.

Hat tip: Scribble Pad

Evidence and policy

I wanted to link to this column for the money quote.

Well, he’s a bishop, and churchmen don’t get listened to except when they say something insane.

I thought of using it as a stand alone quote but context helps somewhat here. The media ignore the church when she states the truth if the truth is offensive to their politically correct ears. But the nutcases....

West goes on to say,

People in more traditional relationships are more likely to vote Conservative – married women are far more likely to vote Tory or Republican than unmarried ones, so it makes sense for conservative parties to encourage conservative lifestyles. Financially punishing stay at home mums is a strange move for a Conservative government,

to which my immediate response was that conservative governments are not particularly conservative. West subsequently notes this,

The reason for this is probably that the British Conservative leadership are not really culturally conservative;

The article is quite good, my partial disagreement is with this comment,

Yet the whole point of evidence-based policy is that evidence is morally neutral; whether it’s offensive is irrelevant.

I am not certain it is morally neutral. Nevertheless, the problem here is that policy is not derived from evidence based research. Evidence can contribute to policy stating whether something works how it is intended, or not. But this is the is/ought problem. Ineffectual policy may be pointless, but effectual policy remains a moral decision. If seatbelts do not save lives it would be silly to legislate for them; yet if they do save lives this is not reason to mandate them. Personal liberty and responsibility may be overriding factors. I am not certain West would disagree with me here. I mention it as I constantly see evidence of benefit conflated with policy.

The moral case for free enterprise

This video gives a moral argument for capitalism. Arthur Brookes claims that principles of capitalism, such as a free market, are not just effective, they are also righteous.



If you don't want to watch the video a similar article can be read here.

Inducing premature labour in cows

A press release from the Green Party of New Zealand condemns the practice of inducing calving so herds can calve together and to maximise milking times. TVNZ News reports

Dairy farmers deliberately birth thousands of calves prematurely each year in a practice known as "inducing". The vet gives the cows two injections, so their calves will be born 8-12 weeks premature. It's done to get all cows in a herd to calve at the same time, and produce milk earlier. It means many calves are born dead, but some are born still alive and have to be euthanised.

...The issue has become an ethical dilemma for New Zealand's $6 billion dairy industry, with approximately 200,000 cows induced in New Zealand each year. Farmers say it's a valuable management tool, but are divided on its use.

The Green Party calls for banning of the practice

Dairy farmers in New Zealand routinely inject cows in order that calves are born – dead or alive – months early. This practice is used so that milking can start earlier.

“This inhumane and cruel practice could put our international dairying reputation at risk,” said Ms Kedgley.

...“Under the Veterinary Code, vets have a specific duty to protect animals and alleviate their suffering.

“By dispensing drugs that allow induction to take place for economic rather than animal welfare reasons, vets are deliberately inflicting suffering on healthy animals.

“This surely is a breach of their code.”

Here is a description of the technique; why and how it is done. It is used maintain seasonal patterns for future calving.

Interestingly the Green Party supports induced abortion in pregnant women, and as part of their women's health policy promote increased access to abortion. Women's Policy point 6.26 states the Green Party will

Review abortion services to ensure equity of access for women throughout New Zealand.

Elsewhere on the website Kedgley speaks approvingly of the battle to legalise abortion.

I recognise that a large number of secularly minded people approve of abortion. But approving human abortion for the convenience of the mother while at the same time opposed aborting and euthanasing (newborn) calves for the convenience of the farmer is not just morally confused, it is morally corrupt. Of course opposition to such practice reveals Green ideology.

Atheists just as ethical as churchgoers?

The telegraph recently had an article about the morality of atheists.

Atheists are just as ethical and have as strong a moral compass as churchgoers, new research shows.

People who have no religion know right from wrong just as well as regular worshippers, according to the study.

There is no source, as seems increasingly common these days. Newspaper articles appear link to their sources less than bloggers. I think the study may be "The origins of religion : evolved adaptation or by-product?" (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.007).

The Telegraph article goes on to state

But people who did not have a religious background still appeared to have intuitive judgments of right and wrong in common with believers, according to the findings, published in the journal Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

If I am correct about the source article, this may be in reference to this moral evaluator which the article links to. This looks at difficult, artificial, unlikely moral dilemmas, what to do when faced with competing loss of life, and the issue of double effect. It does not ask which type of behaviours are right or wrong.

Of course knowledge of right behaviour does not equate to practice of right behaviour. But is this information surprising? Christianity teaches all men know about God's requirements.

For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. (Romans 1)

Study author Hauser states

The research suggests that intuitive judgments of right and wrong seem to operate independently of explicit religious commitments.

While one would hope that Christians exhibit better moral praxis than atheists, Christianity does not require or specify that atheists only perform immoral actions. What Christianity argues is that atheism as a philosophy offers no reason for morality to exist at all. It is not primarily whether atheism makes people eumoral or immoral—though that is also a point, one I do not think the study adequately addresses—rather it is that atheism logically implies that all actions are amoral. There is no ought, only preferences.

Moral perspectives on lying

There are a range of Christian theories on the moral acceptability of lying.

The issues around lying seem difficult to fully categorise in English. The problem is a lack of simple words to express subtle differences in meaning. To illustrate this note that the concept of lying can be considered analogous to killing. With killing we have sub-terms such as murder, manslaughter, and capital punishment. We also recognise killing in a variety of situations such as warfare and self-defence. The debate about the morality of types of killing is more transparent because we agree on meaning, even if we disagree or the moral acceptability of them.

Whereas "lying" merely means distorting the truth irrespective of the circumstances. There are terms such as deception, falsification, untruthfulness, but these are basically synonymous. There are situational terms though, such as perjury.

So is falsehood a single conceptual category? I have long thought it meaningful that the 9th commandment is not, "You shall not lie," but rather, "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour." I have previously distinguished between reality and what one perceives as reality stating that affirming a false belief is not lying. I have also made the distinction between voluntary and forced disclosure of information which I wish to expand on here.

The moral debate is that either:

• lying (or specific types or lying) is objectively wrong, that is, various forms of absolutism; or
• lying is not intrinsically wrong (for all people), (though it may be preferable to avoid in certain situations for other reasons), that is, forms of subjectivism.

Christianity claims that morality has its source in the moral law giver, thus it views the morality of truth telling as objective: the same rules for all people at all times. Here are particular forms of such absolutism.

1. Unqualified Absolutism

Lying is always wrong. People should never lie ever. No matter what the situation or consequences.

Doug Beaumont explains such unqualified absolutism.

Unqualified Absolutism is based on the idea that most moral actions are intrinsically right or wrong, and because sin is always avoidable there can be no actual moral conflict. Given a choice between telling the truth or lying to avoid a murder, for example, one must choose telling the truth for in that instance it is not the one speaking, but the murderer who is sinning. In that case it is better to permit sin than to commit it. This view states that moral "oughts" are viable regardless of their consequences, for any moral philosophy that has exceptions results in relativism. Moral law is based on God's unchanging nature, therefore moral law itself is unchanging. Logically, if an act is intrinsically evil, it cannot become good because of a changing situation. Finally, God can always provide a third alternative to sinful actions.

This is how many people view lying. It is a somewhat reasonable but it lacks depth. Exceptions to rules don't intrinsically mean relativism. True, exceptions can be special pleading or hypocrisy, but they may be legitimate (eg. age based rules). And as I note below, unqualified absolutism may conflate intrinsically different actions.

2. Conflicting absolutism

Lying is wrong, but it needs to be considered within the situation. If lying conflicts with another moral commandment then one must do obey the higher moral. But lying, while required, is still sinful.

Such a position acknowledges that we have moral conflict (at least in this age). I think this is an improvement as it notes that as bad as lying may be, it may not be the greatest evil (though lying is a bigger evil than many acknowledge). This position encourages people to do good and love their neighbour.

It fails in that it suggests at times all options a man may have involve sin. However if we wish to do right, Scripture suggests we are able to do so (thru God). Further, how much less are we to blame when others have placed us in a dilemma, rather than our own prior choices.

3. Graded absolutism

Lying is wrong unless it conflicts with a higher moral commandment. Obeying the higher moral by lying is not wrong or sinful.

This resolves the dilemma of not being able to make a right choice. It affirms moral conflict, but it claims that the choice to do the better is good. And not sinful if a greater good is being done. There may be some support from Jesus' words to the Pharisees. It discussing tithing garden herbs Jesus states

But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God. These you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.

While one could claim that tithing herbs and doing justice are morally equal—Jesus does say not to neglect the former—the context would suggest that doing justice is a higher moral command. Apologists for unqualified absolutism could argue Jesus commands they do both, but there is no conflict between moral obligations set up here, so unqualified absolutism cannot be proven from the passage. I am merely illustrating that moral commands are graded.

It is important to note that this is not arguing that the end justifies the means. Yes, the end is considered, but for the sake of doing good, not for preferred result. Doing good may have unpleasant consequences.

4. Libertarian absolutism

Lying is wrong if one is voluntarily giving information. One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information. I am responsible for my actions, not yours.

This has the advantage over graded absolutism in that it recognises that voluntary information and compelled information are categorically different. It is somewhat analogous to saying that predatory killing is sinful but self-defensive killing is not.

Interestingly Jesus' words may shed some light on our understanding here.

After this Jesus went about in Galilee. He would not go about in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him. Now the Jews’ Feast of Booths was at hand. So his brothers said to him, "Leave here and go to Judea, that your disciples also may see the works you are doing. For no one works in secret if he seeks to be known openly. If you do these things, show yourself to the world." For not even his brothers believed in him. Jesus said to them, "My time has not yet come, but your time is always here. The world cannot hate you, but it hates me because I testify about it that its works are evil. You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, for my time has not yet fully come." After saying this, he remained in Galilee.

But after his brothers had gone up to the feast, then he also went up, not publicly but in private. The Jews were looking for him at the feast, and saying, "Where is he?" And there was much muttering about him among the people. While some said, "He is a good man," others said, "No, he is leading the people astray." Yet for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him.

About the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and began teaching. (John 7, emphasis added)

Jesus said he wasn't going but then he did. This implies that Jesus' answer was not true. In fact some manuscripts say, "I am not yet going up to this feast." Which would seem to make Jesus' answer more honest. Looking at the passage it is clear Jesus wished to go without others initially knowing he was there. He is asked if he is going, however Jesus does not wish to tell this person. Being evasive may be construed as a yes. Jesus says that he is not going to this feast. Within the libertarian absolutism view a request is made of Jesus to divulge information he does not wish to give and he is at liberty to answer in a way that does not divulge same information.

This position is distinct from graded absolutism in that one is not weighing up morality in conflict. The distinction is in will for informing.

Although one could think nothing one hears in conversation is reliable, the solution is listen to what people wish to tell you.

5. Authoritative absolutism

Non aggressive version

• Lying is wrong in non-aggressive situations. Self-defence against an aggressor allows for lying. Authorities are owed the truth.

Libertarian version

• One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information unless being compelled by a legitimate authority.

Authoritative absolutism states the voluntary information must be true as per libertarian absolutism, or that all information must be true unless facing an aggressor. It states that, in general, compelled information does not need to be true though there can be variation on what is meant by compulsion.

But this position does allow an appropriate authority to force information (whereas strict libertarian absolutism would not). A person following libertarian absolutism would allow one to lie in court if he did not wish to divulge the truth. Non-aggressive absolutism would mean that it is eumoral (morally good) to tell the truth in legitimate courts and immoral to withhold it. Note the caveat: obeying a lesser authority is not required if that means disobeying a higher one. Obeying a policeman, a ruler, or a court is necessary even unjust ones, or in unpleasant circumstances; unless doing so compromises a higher earthly ruler or God.

Conclusion

People may argue for the legitimacy of any of these options within Christian theology. Unless one recognises that the concept of lying may include more than one category, graded absolutism is as far as one can advance and this seems to be the best approach. However the knowledge of a permissible sub-categorisation based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing allows for more nuanced views.

New Zealand voters do not wish to criminalise smacking

Following from my recent post on whether or not parents who smack should be criminals. The preliminary results to the recent New Zealand citizen's initiated referendum are available. To the question:

• Should a smack as part of good parental correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?

1.6 million of an eligible 3.0 million people (54%) voted by postal ballot.

Vote Yes

• A smack as part of good parental correction should be a criminal offence

got 12%.

Vote No

• A smack as part of good parental correction should not be a criminal offence

got 88%.

Results of referendums are not binding for New Zealand government.

Dog food?

Auckland resident Paea Taufa killed and cooked his dog this past weekend. He was visited by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) but not prosecuted as his actions are legal.

He rendered the dog unconscious with a blow to the head before slitting its throat, which is regarded as humane.

Under the Animal Welfare Act it is legal to kill a dog in New Zealand if the animal is slaughtered swiftly and painlessly.

That did not stop several persons from condemning him and calling for a ban on the consumption of dog meat in New Zealand. SPCA Auckland chief executive Garth Halliday said,

Although we appreciate the difference of cultures that exist in a place like New Zealand, the SPCA finds this sort of treatment of any animal to be totally unacceptable,... Even though the law says you can humanely kill an animal, you should not be treating any animal like this.

And SPCA chief executive Robyn Kippenberger said,

The slaughtering, roasting and eating of a dog or other companion animal is simply abhorrent to our culture as New Zealanders.

Korean Garden Trust spokesman Stanley Park was surprised it was legal in New Zealand. He also stated,

Dog eating may be part of our history, but most Koreans today would consider eating dogs totally barbaric - and our culture actually forbids us making a meal of animals that are considered companions.

Save Animals From Exploitation voiced objection as well. Hans Kriek said,

While we are opposed to the killing of all animals for eating, banning the consumption of dog meat would be a good start.

And a variety of others have expressed their thoughts on this, many of the opponents calling for a ban.

Now I have never tasted dog meat. I don't have a strong desire to facilitate my consumption of it at a later stage, though I would be prepared to try it, or eat it if offered it in a culture where my refusal would be seen as offensive.

But why the call for banning? You don't like the idea of eating a dog, don't eat one.

Kriek's comment is revealing. He opposes all meat eating and just sees this as a step in eventual banning of all carnivory. It is, however, probably the most consistent position among the opponents.

When people find something icky what makes them strongly desire to prevent everyone else from doing it? These same people would likely strongly object if I imposed bans on their preferred behaviours. I am not a particular fan of tattoos or body piercing, but I do not support calls to make it illegal.

I am all for debate, and some things should be illegal. But the speed at which people are prepared to jump from "I wouldn't do that" to "no one should ever be allowed to do that" is phenomenal. This in an age when the call for tolerance is greater than at many other times in history.*

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* I am not suggesting I support this age's call for tolerance, just noting that we are in it—though rapidly moving away from it.